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CAN AGENCIES LIE? A REALIST’S GUIDE TO PRETEXT
REVIEW
JACK THORLIN*
ABSTRACT
Can federal agencies lie about why they issue a rule—and should they
be able to? In the recent case of Department of Commerce v. New York,
Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion for the Court upheld a district court
ruling that the Department of Commerce’s use of a pretextual explanation
for its proposed addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 Census violated
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The four liberal-leaning Justices
joined the Chief Justice’s decision on pretext, but they also would have found
the rulemaking arbitrary and capricious on other grounds. The four
conservative-leaning Justices dissented regarding pretext, stopping just
short of saying that pretextual explanations are acceptable under the APA.
The state of jurisprudence on pretext is now uncertain. Department of
Commerce left several questions unanswered, including precisely how courts
are to determine whether an explanation is pretextual, how agencies might
“fix” a rule remanded back to them on grounds of pretext, and whether the
case’s unique factual circumstances render the doctrine largely inapplicable
to other contexts. The new doctrine presents an unpalatable choice for
courts: require seemingly utopian candor from federal agencies tasked with
implementing democratically-endorsed agendas, or permit evident
falsehoods on the part of political agency heads. From a policy perspective,
there are compelling arguments on both sides of the proposition. Allowing
agencies to use pretextual explanations increases democratic control over
the regulatory process by permitting increased political influence over the
supposedly technocratic agencies.
However, prohibiting pretextual
explanations could improve both the substance and transparency of
rulemaking.
This Article argues that pretext doctrine should be understood as a
reaction to the abuse of expertise, as originally technocratic agencies have
been increasingly employed to achieve properly legislative political ends.
The legal process should proceed as follows: When plaintiffs make an initial
showing that the agency may have acted in bad faith, a reviewing court
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should authorize additional discovery, and overturn the agency action if the
agency issued a pretextual explanation. The agency then automatically loses
the presumption of regularity and the court should impose a higher standard
of review if the agency tries to reissue a substantively identical rule.
Evidence of pretext can and should rebut the ordinary deference courts show
toward agencies. While care should be taken to craft a realistic pretext
doctrine, the complexities of pretext review should not dissuade courts from
trying to improve agency honesty.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue is simply stated: Can agencies lie about why they take actions?
If so, in what ways can they lie? Can they offer an explanation that was
entirely irrelevant to the process? What if the decisionmaker was aware of
the proffered rationale, but it seems very unlikely that it influenced their
decision? The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) allows judicial review
of agency actions to ensure a reasoned decision-making process, but it does
not explicitly place the motive of anyone involved in the process at issue. 1
Although lower federal courts have obliquely addressed the issue, the
Supreme Court recently plunged into the fray in Department of Commerce v.
New York.2 The Court held that the Department of Commerce’s addition of
a citizenship question to the 2020 Census was based on a pretextual rationale,
and therefore the agency’s action violated the APA.3
Before Department of Commerce, the answer to “can agencies lie?” was
a tacit “yes.” While that answer may offend the naive, there has been a clear
jurisprudential and policy explanation for it. Just as the law avoids inquiring
too deeply into the mental state of jurors to preserve the democratic

1. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
2. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (Dep’t of Com.).
3. Id. at 2575–76.
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legitimacy of jury trials,4 allowing agencies to act pretextually preserves the
President’s ability to effect policy change through agencies ostensibly
premised on non-democratic expertise and avoids the need for messy and
penetrating inquiries into the mental state of agency decisionmakers.5
Judging by the outcome of Department of Commerce, the utilitarian
calculus of agency mendacity appears to have shifted during the Trump
administration. Courts historically countenanced agencies acting politically
if the agency could produce a somewhat plausible alternative explanation. 6
However, a broad perception of agency ineptitude combined with the
specifically implausible agency explanation in Department of Commerce left
the judiciary in an ugly situation. If agencies can brazenly lie and courts are
unwilling to acknowledge it, the public will rationally grow to distrust both
federal agencies and the federal judiciary. People might reasonably object
that citizens who lie under oath are perjurers, but agencies lying about their
actions face no consequences. Open mendacity also presents a challenge to
the constitutional balance of power because the agencies hold power granted
by Congress based on their supposed expertise—if agencies lie about why
they act, on what basis is the grant of power by Congress legitimate?
In a parallel development, with Congress largely unable to pass major
legislation, ideologically-driven change in the federal government frequently
originates with executive branch agencies. Upon taking office, presidents
and their administrations already know what major regulatory actions they
want to take; often, they have made specific campaign promises to take those
actions.7 When it comes time to actually issue the rule, the agency must
4. See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 115–16, 127 (1987) (declining to overturn
a verdict returned by a jury whose members had consumed alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during
the trial and deliberations).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 420–22 (1941) (Morgan IV) (holding that
an agency decisionmaker in a quasi-judicial setting should not be subject to inquiries into mental
processes under most circumstances).
6. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding an
agency rule because the agency offered an “alternative rationale based on the confluence of
independently improbable assumptions” despite the agency’s analysis “bear[ing] every evidence of
having been inserted as a make-weight by someone who had not the slightest idea what he was
talking about”).
7. See, for example, the repeal of the Clean Power Plan under President Trump’s
Environmental Protection Agency, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019). As a candidate, Donald
Trump said at a rally: “I will eliminate all needless and job-killing regulations now on the
books. . . . [That] also means scrapping the EPA’s so-called Clean Power Plan which the
government itself estimates will cost $7.2 billion a year. This Obama-Clinton directive will shut
down most, if not all, coal-powered electricity plans in America. Remember what Hillary Clinton
said? She wants to shut down the miners, just like she wants to shut down the steel mills.” Tessa
Berenson, Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Jobs and the Economy, TIME (Sept. 15, 2016, 12:38
PM EDT), http://time.com/4495507/donald-trump-economy-speech-transcript/ (providing a
transcript of Trump’s remarks).
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explain the reasons for its action.8 In many cases, the agency offers an
explanation that differs from the rationale put forth by the President or his
advisors in a campaign setting or in private discussions and correspondence.9
However, the APA created a judicial review process that requires, among
other things, that agencies engage in a reasoned decision-making process.10
Some courts have interpreted the APA’s requirement as also requiring a
disclosure of the actual reasons for the decision made.11 Other courts have
been satisfied as long as there existed some sufficiently rational explanation,
even if other unspoken reasons seemed more central.12
The recent case Department of Commerce v. New York marked the
Supreme Court’s first clear foray into the issue of pretext. In a messy 5-4
split, the Court upheld a district court decision that invalidated and remanded
the Department of Commerce’s addition of a citizenship question to the 2020
Census.13 Chief Justice John Roberts, joined in the controlling section by the
Court’s four liberal Justices, declared that the Department had offered a
pretextual justification that rendered the underlying action invalid under the
APA.14 However, he stressed that courts should rarely allow discovery
outside the administrative record to find the actual justification.15 By
8. Department of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019) (“Our scope of review is
‘narrow’: we determine only whether the Secretary examined ‘the relevant data’ and articulated ‘a
satisfactory explanation’ for his decision, ‘including a rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made.’”).
9. Compare the EPA’s stated rationale for repealing the Clean Power Plan, U.S. EPA,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REPEAL OF THE CLEAN P OWER PLAN, AND THE
EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY
GENERATING UNITS, at ES-2 (June 2019), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201906/documents/utilities_ria_final_cpp_repeal_and_ace_2019-06.pdf (“[T]he EPA concludes that
even if the CPP were implemented, it would not achieve emission reductions beyond those that
would be achieved in a business-as-usual projection.”), with statements Donald Trump made during
his campaign, Donald Trump, Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Hilton Head, South Carolina, CSPAN (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.c-span.org/video/?402610-1/donald-trump-campaign-rallyhilton-head-south-carolina&start=2138&transcriptQuery=hoax (“Obama’s talking about all of this
with the global warming and the—a lot of it’s a hoax, it’s a hoax. I mean, it’s a money-making
industry, OK? It’s a hoax, a lot of it.”) (emphasis omitted).
10. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983)
(“[T]he agency must explain the evidence which is available, and must offer a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
11. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(“[T]he evidence is clear that Secretary Ross’s rationale was pretextual — that is, that the real reason
for his decision was something other than the sole reason he put forward in his Memorandum . . . .”).
12. See Jagers v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 758 F.3d 1179, 1185–86 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that
a subjective desire on the part of an agency for a particular outcome would not invalidate a
rulemaking that had an objective explanation).
13. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2574–75.
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remanding, he also offered the Department an opportunity to present
evidence of an alternative motive.16 The four liberal Justices, unified in one
opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, joined the pretext section to make
it control the outcome of the case. But they focused much of their attention
on arguing that the Department’s decision was arbitrary and capricious on
other grounds, regardless of whether it was pretextual.17
The conservative Justices openly disagreed with the Chief Justice on the
facts of the case, but seemed to tacitly agree on doctrine, largely contenting
themselves with dramatic declarations about how unprecedented a review for
pretext would be.18 Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for himself, Justice
Neil Gorsuch, and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, opined that federal agencies are
owed a “presumption of regularity” that normally precludes inquiry into
whether their explanation is pretextual.19 The conservative Justices’ opinion
consistently hedges, never quite ruling out the possibility of overruling a
pretextual decision when it would be appropriate to overturn.20 Justice Alito
wrote separately, arguing that the APA did not apply to the question at hand
at all. In dicta, however, he strongly condemned the idea of considering
whether an agency rationale is pretextual.21 He colorfully opined, “[w]hat
Bismarck is reputed to have said about laws and sausages comes to mind.” 22
The Supreme Court’s disagreement over whether agencies can act based
on pretext digs up fundamental debates about the role of executive branch
agencies. Are they technocratic instruments designed to enforce Congress’s
will in areas where Congress lacks technical knowledge or capacity?23 Or
are agencies an extension of the president’s will—a sort of exoskeleton that
can bring campaign promises to fruition?24 Is it pointless to try to stamp out
pretext when agencies literally do not have a singular intent and can
practically never be wholly truthful about their reasons for acting?
I will argue that while there are serious philosophical questions to raise
about pretext review, they are surmountable, and the doctrine itself is a
16. Id. at 2576.
17. Id. at 2584 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
18. See, e.g., id. at 2576, 2579 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
Court’s holding reflects an unprecedented departure from our deferential review of discretionary
agency decisions. . . . Unsurprisingly, then, this Court has never held an agency decision arbitrary
and capricious on the ground that its supporting rationale was ‘pretextual.’”).
19. Id. at 2578.
20. See, e.g., id. at 2596 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 2597–98 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. Id. at 2597 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. This is the general theory behind the “intelligible principle” of the nondelegation doctrine,
discussed at length most recently in Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
24. This is the general theory behind the “unitary executive” principle most clearly outlined in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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necessary corrective to the trend of agency politicization. With eyes open to
the practical difficulties of pretext review, courts can and should develop a
detailed doctrine to promote truthful explanations from agencies. Part I of
this Article reviews the history of how federal courts have dealt with the
issue, including recent Supreme Court decisions relating to Trump
administration policies.25 Part II discusses the theoretical and practical
difficulties of judicial review of pretextual decision-making.26 Part III
addresses criticisms of pretext review and suggests ways in which the
doctrine could evolve to rebut those criticisms.27
I. THE JUDICIARY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH PRETEXT
The state of jurisprudence on agency pretext was foggy before the
Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Commerce.28 Agencies could
not openly lie, it seems, but they could avoid most judicial oversight
regarding pretext without much effort.29 The messy split decision in
Department of Commerce renders the precise state of pretext law unclear, but
with a careful reading, we can discern the new rule of pretext. The Roberts
pretext doctrine did not overturn precedent, but it essentially invented a new
APA requirement largely divorced from the text of the APA itself. In so
doing, it is unclear how much pretext doctrine will actually change agency
behavior. In their opinions, the conservative Justices seem to fear that pretext
review is a powder keg sitting beneath the walls of administrative law,30 but
the specific circumstances of Department of Commerce led skeptics to
believe Chief Justice Roberts created pretext doctrine to solve one thorny
case where the Trump administration was caught acting in an underhanded
way.31 Subsequent case law will determine whether this interpretation is
correct, or if pretext doctrine charts a more moderate course.
25. See infra Part I.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See, e.g., Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that FDA
actions relating to emergency contraceptives were arbitrary and capricious because they were “not
the result of reasoned and good faith agency decision-making”, but not clarifying whether the
agency’s use of a pretextual justification was per se arbitrary and capricious).
29. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, supra note 6 (upholding agency action that the court
itself mocked for being uninformed).
30. See Department of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2583-84 (2019)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s decision enables partisans to use the courts to harangue
executive officers through depositions, discovery, delay, and distraction” and “could even implicate
separation-of-powers concerns insofar as it enables judicial interference with the enforcement of
laws.”)
31. See Nicholas Bronni, Census Symposium: Unusual Facts Make for Unusual Decisions,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/census-symposium-unusual-
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A. Pretext’s Prologue: The Judiciary’s Relationship with Agency
Truthfulness
The pre-Department of Commerce jurisprudence relating to pretext
dealt less with the genuineness of agency explanations than the circumstances
in which courts should review evidence outside the administrative record.32
These cases did not answer the question of whether agencies could give
pretextual explanations, but tended to imply answers. One cannot avoid the
impression that courts found it simply unseemly to question whether an
agency decisionmaker had lied in offering an explanation for the agency’s
action.33 Instead of directly questioning agency truthfulness, courts allowed
an additional inquiry under some circumstances into whether the agency had
included all evidence under consideration in the administrative record.34 The
leading Supreme Court case pushing lower courts to probe further into
agency decision-making processes, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe,35 did not by any means prohibit pretextual decision-making; it
merely held that, absent agency explanation, courts could inquire into the
agency’s actual rationale.36 However, while the pre-Department of
Commerce cases do not lend obvious support for inquiries into the
truthfulness of a proffered agency explanation, they keep the door open to
such an inquiry just enough to allow an eventual decision like Department of
Commerce.37
B. Early Cases: The Morgan Doctrine Suggests Pretext is Irrelevant
Regulation has always engendered political opposition, but courts did
not meaningfully address issues relating to the truthfulness of agency
rationales until the middle of the twentieth century. Administrative law
evolved under political pressure stemming from philosophical attacks on

facts-make-for-unusual-decisions/ (arguing that Department of Commerce will likely have little
precedential effect because of the unique circumstances of the case).
32. See Travis O. Brandon, Reforming the Extra-Record Evidence Rule in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review of Informal Agency Actions: A New Procedural Approach, 21 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 981, 991–94 (2017).
33. See, e.g., Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 421 (“[B]oth [judges and Cabinet officers charged by
Congress with adjudicatory functions] are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual
discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.”).
34. See, e.g., Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
35. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
36. Id. at 420.
37. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971), abrogated
by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (holding that, in the absence of formal agency findings,
a court could order a review of the actual administrative record considered by the agency head when
he made his decision in order to determine whether his actions violated the APA).
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regulation and more nuanced demands for adequate process.38 Early cases
applied specific statutory requirements for particular kinds of rules, but
generally did not look deeply into the motivations of agency decisionmakers.
If a specific statute said that an agency had to consider a certain kind of
evidence, and plaintiffs could show the agency had not made such a
consideration, then the courts would intervene.39 Courts generally left open
the question of whether motivations mattered.40
From the emergence of a major regulatory state in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries up to the adoption of the APA in 1946, judicial
oversight of agency rulemaking largely related to substance. An antiregulation judiciary fought administrative power on philosophical and
constitutional grounds. Various constitutional provisions and doctrines
provided the main check on abusive agency rulemaking, most notably the
nondelegation doctrine in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.41 In Panama
Refining, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not give the President
legislative powers without clear guidance on how to use them.42 Eventually,
the constitutional attacks on regulation provoked political counterattacks
against the Supreme Court by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, leading
to the Supreme Court stepping down from its substantive attack on the power
to regulate in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.43 Once President Roosevelt
successfully pressured the Supreme Court to abandon constitutional
doctrines against administrative rulemaking, resistance to regulatory
expansion shifted to procedural grounds.44
Against a complicated factual background, the 1941 case United States
v. Morgan45 addressed the issue of pretext, though it framed the issue in terms
of bias.46 The Secretary of Agriculture had, pursuant to statute, set a
maximum rate for services rendered by private agencies doing business at the

38. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (invalidating a regulation on baker’s
hours on grounds that it violated a common law right to freedom of contract protected in the due
process clause); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 22 (1938) (Morgan II) (holding that a hearing
held by the Secretary of Agriculture was procedurally defective).
39. See Morgan II, 304 U.S. at 22 (holding that a hearing held by the Secretary of Agriculture
was procedurally defective).
40. See, e.g., Morgan IV, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) (holding that there is a presumption of validity
in the motive for an agency decision which can only be overcome by exceptional evidence).
41. 293 U.S. 388, 428 (1935).
42. Id.
43. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
44. John Q. Barrett, Attribution Time: Cal Tinney’s 1937 Quip, “A Switch in Time’ll Save
Nine”, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 229 (2021).
45. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
46. Id. at 420–22.
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Kansas City Stockyards.47 The statute required the Secretary to provide a
hearing for the agencies, and the Supreme Court had held in two previous
cases that the Secretary: (a) had to hold a hearing; and (b) could not satisfy
the procedural requirements by simply reading the agencies’ testimonies.48
In a third case, the Court held that the Secretary did not have to return excess
payments made by the agencies until the Department of Agriculture held a
new hearing to determine what the reasonable payment rate should have
been.49 The fourth case, the most relevant to the present discussion, came
after the hearing that was the subject of the third case.50 There, the Secretary
sent a letter to the New York Times criticizing the Court’s ruling in the second
case, as well as the idea of returning money to the agencies.51 The agencies
argued that the letter showed the Secretary’s bias because he wrote it before
deciding the retroactive rates that would determine the agency’s repayment
obligations.52 The Secretary formally denied harboring any bias.53
The Supreme Court held that the Secretary did not have to deny his bias
because Congress had entrusted him to act as a judge.54 According to the
Court:
Cabinet officers charged by Congress with adjudicatory functions
are not assumed to be flabby creatures any more than judges are.
Both may have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific
case. But both are assumed to be men of conscience and
intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy
fairly on the basis of its own circumstances. Nothing in this record
disturbs such an assumption.55
This case’s assumption that agency decisionmakers, like judges, should
not have their inner mental processes probed developed into a subset of the
deliberative process privilege.56 While we all may suspect that judges, like
everyone else, can harbor bias, the Morgan doctrine argues that public trust
in the legal system requires a presumption that judges will act impartially.57
47. Id. at 413.
48. Morgan v. United States (Morgan I), 298 U.S. 468, 477–79 (1936); Morgan II, 304 U.S. 1,
13–14 (1938).
49. United States v. Morgan (Morgan III), 307 U.S. 183, 197–98 (1939).
50. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 414.
51. Id. at 420.
52. Id. at 420.
53. Id. at 421.
54. Id. at 422.
55. Id. at 421.
56. See generally Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege,
54 MO. L. REV. 279 (1989).
57. See McKay Coppins, Is Brett Kavanaugh Out for Revenge?, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/06/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court/618717/
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As developed through federal common law, the Morgan doctrine, stated
succinctly, is: “current high-ranking government officials should not be
subject to the taking of depositions absent extraordinary circumstances.”58
Most courts justified the doctrine as a way to avoid wasting the time of
agency decisionmakers.59 However, if there is a “showing of grounds to
suspect bad faith or improper behavior not apparent from the administrative
record,” then such a deposition could be warranted.60 Weighing the strength
of evidence showing bad faith against concern for the time of agency
decisionmakers suggests that the more senior the decisionmaker, the stronger
the showing of bad faith or improper behavior must be in order to justify
deposition.61
What sort of “bad faith or improper behavior” could justify deposing a
high-ranking government official and, more specifically, examining his or
her mental processes? Few cases address the issue at all, much less discuss
it at length. One successful showing led a court to order deposition of the
Comptroller of the Currency on the allegation that he had issued a branch
certificate to a particular bank because of a “personal relationship.” 62
Another successful case involved a prima facie showing that a specific law
had been violated by the official claiming protection under Morgan.63
The Morgan doctrine can be read to either support or denigrate the idea
of investigating pretext. On one hand, the doctrine creates a strong
presumption against obtaining evidence about agency decisionmakers’
mental processes. If one cannot obtain evidence about those processes, it is
difficult to prove that the actual rationale differs from the agency’s stated
rationale. On the other hand, what is pretext if not a form of “bad faith”? If
a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the agency is lying about the
reason the decisionmaker made his decision, would that not be the sort of bad
faith that would enable deeper investigation into the mental process?
There is an unspoken assumption here that if bad faith is shown and
subsequent investigation finds strong bias, then that would provide grounds
for invalidating the agency action in question. However, it is not clear from
the terms of Morgan what the grounds for invalidating the action would have
been. The specific statute in question in Morgan did not require an absence
(explaining that the Court itself is “invested in maintaining the perception that [its] work is done
beyond the reach of rank politics”).
58. United States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 309, 316 (D.N.J. 2009).
59. Church of Scientology of Bos. v. I.R.S., 138 F.R.D. 9, 12 (D. Mass. 1990).
60. Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 96 F.R.D. 619, 621 (D.D.C.
1983).
61. Id.
62. Union Sav. Bank of Patchogue, N.Y. v. Saxon, 209 F. Supp. 319, 319–320 (D.D.C. 1962).
63. Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 1964).
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of bias. The Supreme Court later found that constitutional due process
requires some level of impartiality, but that is a far cry from forbidding
pretextual decision-making.64 It is also noteworthy that Morgan involved a
quasi-judicial agency activity, not a run-of-the-mill policy decision.65 At the
time of Morgan, courts were still a long way off from requiring impartiality
as to policy, even if Morgan implied impartiality might be required in a
tribunal-like setting.
C. The Administrative Procedure Act’s Silence on Pretext
As courts moved away from constitutional arguments to curtail
regulations, Congress increasingly took a more active role. If courts would
not prevent overregulation on constitutional grounds, Congress could at least
moderate executive power through process requirements.66 Consequently,
lawmakers in Congress wary of overregulation began pressing for set
processes that would restrain the executive branch.67 Five years after
Morgan, Congress’s work culminated in the passage of the APA in 1946.68
The APA statute does not discuss pretext in its text, but one can see hints
at the concept. The relevant portion of the APA sounds simple on its face: a
court reviewing an agency action shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 69 The
legislative history from 1946 reveals very little discussion of the precise
meaning of “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion,” let alone
contemplation over whether it would include pretext.70 In the House report
accompanying passage of the APA, the Judiciary Committee stated: “It
will . . . be the duty of reviewing courts to prevent avoidance of the
requirements of the bill by any manner or form of indirection, and to
determine the meaning of the words and phrases used.”71 Here, the Judiciary
64. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
65. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422.
66. See Roni Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 FORDHAM
ENV’T L. REV. 207, 209–11 (2016).
67. Id.
68. Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
70. Id.; see generally, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1980 (1946) (House report contains no discussion of
specific meaning of arbitrary and capricious); Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. (1945) (House Judiciary Committee hearings on the
Administrative Procedure Act contain no discussion of the meaning of arbitrary and capricious);
Administrative Procedure Act: Proceedings in the H.R. & the S., 79th Cong. (1946) (House and
Senate committee hearings on the APA contain no discussion of the meaning of arbitrary and
capricious).
71. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, at 278.
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Committee left open the possibility of “arbitrary” or “capricious”
encompassing pretext as a form of “indirection.”72
It should not be at all surprising that “arbitrary” and “capricious”
encapsulate many different concepts. One meaning of “arbitrary” is “existing
or coming about seemingly at random or by chance or as a capricious and
unreasonable act of will.”73 Another is “marked by or resulting from the
unrestrained and often tyrannical exercise of power.”74 Yet another is “based
on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by
necessity or the intrinsic nature of something.”75 There are three inconsistent
ideas to define what “arbitrary” could mean: (1) random; (2) unreasonable;
or (3) unilateral to the point of tyranny. “[C]apricious” also fails to help. The
primary definition is “governed or characterized by caprice,”76 which in turn
is defined as “a sudden, impulsive, and seemingly unmotivated notion or
action” or “a sudden usually unpredictable condition, change, or series of
changes.”77 From those definitions, I take two shades of meaning relevant
for a discussion of pretext: (1) a lack of clear reason; and (2) unpredictability.
The very definition of “pretext” includes the concept that it is used “to cloak
the real intention or state of affairs”.78 Offering a false explanation inherently
makes the true explanation less clear.
Despite these arguments for connecting pretext review to arbitrary and
capricious review, some courts that have held that the APA prohibits
pretextual decision-making do not consistently point to any particular
provision of the APA prohibiting pretext when they overturn agency
actions.79 But others have specified that pretext violates the prohibition
against arbitrary and capricious actions.80 A reasonable reader, coming to the
APA for the first time, might think that a decision made on pretextual grounds
is arbitrary. A simple analogy illuminates that interpretation—police

72. Id.
73. Arbitrary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/arbitrary
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Capricious,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/capricious (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).
77. Caprice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caprice (last
visited Feb. 25, 2021).
78. Pretext, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caprice (last
visited May 19, 2021).
79. See, e.g., N.Y. v. Dep’t of Com., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502,
660, 647, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (discussing arbitrary and capricious review separately from pretext
review).
80. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne, No. CV 07-0038-PHX-MHM, 2008
WL 659822, at *11 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2008).
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enforcement of speed limits. Virtually no one rigorously adheres to speed
limits, so when police do strictly enforce the limits, it certainly seems
pretextual. Indeed, Martin Luther King Jr. was once arrested for driving 30
miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone.81 Given the historical context, we
can be certain this was a pretextual arrest illustrating “arbitrary” power to
punish whoever was disfavored by the police. The Supreme Court has not
embraced that interpretation, however, and so pretext’s connection to the
APA remains undefined.
D. Overton Park and Its Progeny
Before Department of Commerce, the Supreme Court case that most
directly dealt with pretext was Overton Park. It is consistently cited for the
proposition that there can be an inquiry into the mental processes of agency
decisionmakers upon a “strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”82
The ruling sticks out like a sore thumb in the administrative law canon against
intruding into agency decision-making processes—so much so that Justice
Thomas’s partial concurrence in Department of Commerce hinted at his
desire to overturn Overton Park.83 While subsequent cases at lower levels
narrowed Overton Park or stressed its limitations, it remained available as
precedent for Department of Commerce nearly a half century later.84
While the facts of Overton Park make the case seem straightforward,
under the surface, they present questions of agency motivation that dominate
the discussion of pretext. The bare facts are as follows: The Secretary of
Transportation decided that there was no feasible alternative to building a
highway through Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee.85 There were no
formal findings to support his decision; nothing by which a court could judge

81. King Arrested for Speeding; MIA Holds Seven Mass Meetings, STAN. UNIV.: MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. RSCH. & EDUC. INST. (Jan. 26, 1956), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/
encyclopedia/king-arrested-speeding-mia-holds-seven-mass-meetings.
82. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). See, e.g., Kirsch
v. Dep’t of Consumer and Bus. Servs., 278 P.3d 104, 111 (2012).
83. Justice Thomas said in a footnote: “Insofar as Overton Park authorizes an exception to
review on the administrative record, it has been criticized as having ‘no textual grounding in the
APA’ and as ‘created by the Court, without citation or explanation, to facilitate Article III
review.’ . . . The legitimacy and scope of the exception . . . is an important question that may
warrant future consideration.” Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2579 n.5 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
84. See, e.g., Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing the facts
of the case from Overton Park’s general rule against post hoc rationalizations); Voyageurs Nat. Park
Ass’n v. Norton, 381 F.3d 759, 766 (8th Cir. 2004) (stressing that extra-record evidence should not
be allowed unless it is “the only way there can be effective judicial review).
85. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 406–08 (1971), abrogated by
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
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whether the action was arbitrary or capricious.86 The Department supplied
affidavits after the fact stating a justification.87 The Court held that the
Department had to produce a record justifying its decision and, if it did not,
litigants could depose the Secretary to establish what the actual decisionmaking process was.88 Beneath the surface, state, local, and federal officials
were trying to address a variety of political issues, including sociological
factors surrounding the dislocation of people around the park.89 Those
sensitive factors most likely played a role in the Department’s lack of an
administrative record—those various considerations would (a) look bad if
discussed on the record; and (b) force the federal government to weigh in on
sensitive questions it would rather leave up to local and state officials.90
Overton Park was, to put it bluntly, a strange case, and its resolution
raised more questions than answers regarding agency pretext. The Court
ultimately remanded the case to the district court to decide whether a
deposition was necessary.91 The controlling opinion explicitly stated that
post hoc rationalizations had “traditionally been found to be an inadequate
basis for review.”92 However, a mere three paragraphs later, the Court
clarified: “It may be that the Secretary can prepare formal findings including
the information required by DOT Order 5610.1 that will provide an adequate
explanation for his action. Such an explanation will, to some extent, be a
‘post hoc rationalization’ and thus must be viewed critically.”93 One can
reasonably infer from the second statement that a pretextual explanation
could be acceptable, though it must be “viewed critically.” 94 A frustrated
reader in 2019 can be forgiven for wondering what “viewed critically” means
in the context of post hoc rationalizations. Does the rationalization simply
have to be extra compelling? By the very nature of a post hoc rationalization,
it cannot be a genuine description of the thought process that went into the
decision itself, so presumably there is no heightened standard for truthfulness
of the post hoc rationalization as compared to something in the administrative
record.

86. Id. at 408.
87. Id. at 409.
88. Id. at 420.
89. See Peter L. Strauss, Administrative Law Stories: Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe 4, 30 (Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group Paper No.
05-85; Columbia Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 267, 2004), https://scholarship.law.columbia.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2350&context=faculty_scholarship.
90. Id. at 28.
91. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420–21.
92. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419.
93. Id. at 420.
94. Id.
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Lower courts frequently cite Overton Park, but generally have not
expanded on its seeming disregard for pretextual explanations.95 When
upholding the action, courts cited Overton Park for the proposition that courts
owe agencies a “presumption of regularity,” a phrase that Justice Thomas’s
opinion would use in his Department of Commerce dissent.96 Courts finding
that agencies acted arbitrarily or capriciously tended to cite Overton Park for
the proposition that courts could order augmentation of the administrative
record, even absent evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency.97 Some
lower courts found opportunities to narrow Overton Park, some going so far
as to implicitly approve of pretext.98 The most explicit of these, South
Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency,99 a First Circuit case
from 1974, held that “[p]ossibly barring fraud and other extreme
circumstances, the mental process by which the Administrator [of the EPA]
reached his decision, if it is explained by the record, is not a proper subject
for discovery.”100 So long as an agency produced a rationale, a court would
not examine the decisionmaker’s mental processes—in other words, pretext
was acceptable. The D.C. Circuit endorsed that narrow reading of Overton
Park in 1979.101
It is worth briefly noting that when courts describe pretext review as
examining an agency decisionmaker’s “mental processes”, they are
dramatically overstating the level of intrusion needed to evaluate whether a
decision was pretextual. This framing makes it seem as if a court must know
the inside of the decisionmaker’s mind, a seemingly futile undertaking. Of
course, one can actually detect pretext much more easily by looking at
external indicia that a decision has already been made, or that the agency’s
stated justification was not its truthful rationale. For example, if documents
emerge revealing that the decisionmaker directed subordinates to find a
legally acceptable explanation, one need not be a psychologist to understand
that the decisionmaker is seeking a pretext. Presumably, judges choose to
95. See, e.g., City of Coll. Station v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 395 F. Supp. 2d 495, 500 (S.D. Tex.
2005) (citing Overton Park for the proposition that courts should not accept post hoc rationalizations
and should avoid evaluating the mental processes of decisionmakers).
96. See, e.g., Movement Against Destruction v. Trainor, 400 F. Supp. 533, 546–47 (D. Md.
1975) (explaining that agency actors’ actions “are entitled to a presumption of regularity”).
97. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Zinke, No. 17-CV-07187-WHO, 2018 WL 3126401, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. June 26, 2018).
98. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 504 F.2d 646, 675
(1st Cir. 1974).
99. 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974).
100. Id. at 675.
101. National Courier Ass’n v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 516 F.2d
1229, 2142 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Unless he has left no other record of the reasons for his decision, the
mental processes of an administrator may not be probed.”)
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use the phrase “mental processes” as a rhetorical choice to underscore how
difficult they would find something like pretext review to be.
A few lower courts took Overton Park as a signal to go much further in
probing agency decisionmaking processes. The clearest example here is the
D.C. Circuit in 1971, in another case involving then-Secretary of
Transportation Volpe. In D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe,102
an influential member of the House of Representatives threatened to withhold
funding for the District of Columbia rapid transit system unless Secretary
Volpe approved a bridge construction project.103 The Secretary approved the
bridge, and several citizens associations and individual property owners in
the District of Columbia sued, claiming that Secretary Volpe violated the
APA by acting on political grounds rather than reasoned decision-making.104
Secretary Volpe testified that his decision was not based solely on political
pressures.105 The D.C. Circuit nevertheless held that Secretary Volpe’s
decision was arbitrary and capricious because political reasoning “usurp[ed]”
the legitimate considerations the statute required the Secretary to consider.106
This represents one of the most extreme versions of pretext doctrine, whereby
“the Secretary must reach his decision strictly on the merits and in the manner
prescribed by statute, without reference to irrelevant or extraneous
considerations.”107 That phrasing seems to indicate that the existence of a
political motive violates the APA even if the agency had and offered a
legitimate explanation. However, the facts of the case were that the
Department had not made formal findings or a credible administrative
record.108 It is thus more accurate to describe the holding as forbidding
political considerations from taking the place of a technocratic rationale
based on statutorily mandated factors, even if the court’s dicta went further.
E. Between Overton Park and Department of Commerce
Between Overton Park and Department of Commerce, district and
circuit courts occasionally heard cases presenting issues that came very close
to questions of pretext in the context of the APA. In particular, the Tenth
Circuit case Woods Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior109 squarely held

102. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
103. Id. at 1236.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1246.
106. Id. at 1246, 1248.
107. Id. at 1248.
108. Id. at 1237–38.
109. 18 F.3d 854 (10th Cir. 1994), adhered to on reh’g sub nom. Woods Petroleum Corp. v.
Dep’t of Interior, 47 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1995).
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that when a pretextual rationale was the “sole reason” for an agency action,
it was “arbitrary and capricious conduct” and violated the APA. 110 On its
face, the case directly answers the pretext question, but the details muddy the
waters somewhat. Without diving too deeply into the facts of the case, it is
worth noting that the Bureau of Indian Affairs issued guidelines dictating
specific factors the Secretary of the Interior should consider before taking the
action he did.111 Because the Secretary did not consider those factors, the
court, following earlier precedent, stated that the “presumption
of . . . regularity“ did not apply.112 There is thus a case to be made that Woods
Petroleum was not addressing a generic agency pretextual rationale, but a
situation where the court was already according heightened scrutiny to the
agency action.113 That distinction may explain why the cases and briefs citing
Woods Petroleum are generally limited to either specific law relating to cases
involving federal land leases or Trump-era cases desperately searching for a
semblance of precedent to cling to.114
Though few cases directly addressed whether an agency could use a
pretextual explanation, some cases seemed to hint at the logic Justice Roberts
would later employ in Department of Commerce. The most compelling of
these is the 2008 Arizona district court case Center for Biological Diversity
v. Kempthorne.115 In that case, plaintiffs sued the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) over its decision not to define the bald eagle population of
the Sonoran Desert as a distinct population segment warranting protection
under the Endangered Species Act.116 The plaintiffs obtained emails in which
FWS scientists said that their political superiors had “reached [a] policy call
& we need to support [it],” and that their “[a]nswer has to be that its [sic] not
a [distinct population segment] . . . [w]e have marching orders.”117 If that
were not a clear enough indication of pretext, another email simply stated,
“[w]e’ve been given an answer now we need to find an analysis that
works . . . . Need to fit argument in as defensible a fashion as we can.”118
Unfortunately for the development of pretext doctrine, the plaintiffs did their
job a little too well, and the court decided that there was “no information in

110. Id. at 859–60.
111. Id. at 858.
112. Id. at 859.
113. Id.
114. As of May 6, 2021, Westlaw lists five cases citing to Woods Petroleum. Two are Trumpera, two relate to land disputes with the Interior Department, and one is the Supreme Court’s ruling
denying certiorari in the Woods Petroleum litigation.
115. No. CV 07-0038-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 659822 (D. Ariz. Mar. 6, 2008).
116. Id. at *1.
117. Id. at *11 (alterations in original).
118. Id. (alterations in original).
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the FWS’s files to refute” their arguments.119 The court concluded that it
could have “no confidence in the objectivity of the agency’s decision-making
process,” but did not clearly specify whether the pretextual nature of the
agency’s rationale or the lack of an adequate explanation was the basis for
that judgment.120 The outcome of the case suggested a path for pretext
review: If the agency’s process is clearly aimed at generating a pretext, then
it is inherently suspect and therefore arbitrary. However, the absence of
viable evidence supporting the Agency’s decision meant that the rule was
arbitrary and capricious regardless of whether the process was pretextual,
robbing this case of its potential doctrinal importance.
Other cases did not explicitly address pretext, but did restrict the role of
politics in the agency decision-making process. In Tummino v. Torti,121 for
example, the Eastern District of New York remanded a rule back to the FDA
after plaintiffs showed that the Agency had issued the rule to secure the
Senate’s confirmation of a nominee to become the Commissioner of the
FDA.122 The court held that political pressure “was intended to and did cause
the agency’s action to be influenced by factors not relevant under the
controlling statute.”123 That pressure meant that the FDA’s decision “[w]as
[n]ot the [r]esult of [g]ood [f]aith and [r]easoned [a]gency [d]ecision[m]aking.”124 This decision is of limited utility because not every APA
decision has statutorily mandated factors to consider, but the case’s
underlying reasoning is still important. When political impetus reaches a
certain level, it causes the agency process to become inherently arbitrary and
capricious. Pretext is then merely a symptom of an arbitrary and capricious
process, and one would ordinarily expect that the reason for pretext is that
the true underlying rationale is political.
Courts have also haltingly come to understand that deference to
agencies can be conditional on the agencies acting in an aboveboard
manner.125 The most succinct summary of this point can be found in an
unpublished 1999 district court opinion:
If courts are to defer to agency expertise as instructed by Marsh
then they must have confidence in the objectivity of the agency’s
decision making process. On the other hand, if the objectivity of
119. Id. at *12.
120. Id.
121. 603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), amended sub nom. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 05CV-366 ERK VVP, 2013 WL 865851 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013).
122. Id. at 546.
123. Id. at 544.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Am. Wildlands & Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., CV 97-160M-DWM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22243, at *9–10 (D. Mont. Apr. 14, 1999).
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agency decision making is questionable then the rationale for
deference to the agency is undermined and courts must then bring
a more rigorous standard of review to bear. Otherwise there would
be no check on the ability of an agency to circumvent
environmental laws by simply “going-through-the-motions[.]” 126
This point has no grounding in existing jurisprudence, but the concept
of conditional deference to agency expertise arguably lies at the heart of
pretext review.127 There is little reason to defer to agency expertise if factors
unrelated to expertise dominated the decision-making process.
F. Department of Commerce v. New York: Dawn of Pretext Review
Department of Commerce created, for the first time, a rule of pretext.128
However, the factual predicate of the case and the political furor surrounding
it was uniquely suited to a finding of pretext.129 It is not yet clear if the
specific set of facts created a rule ultimately applicable in only this case, or
if pretext review will become an important new doctrine. The case revolved
around Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross’s decision to add a question
about citizenship to the 2020 Census. 130 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and
the extreme facts found by the Southern District of New York at the trial
court level make this case more the skeleton of a rule of pretext than a fullfledged doctrine.131 Later sections of this Article will examine how the rule
should be fleshed out. For now, Department of Commerce shows that while
tough cases can make bad law, easy cases can make uncertain law.
1. The Roberts Rule of Pretext
To understand Roberts’s rule, it is worth briefly examining the district
court’s ruling, which Roberts decidedly did not adopt. The district court’s
doctrinal rationale was simple: It ruled that Secretary Ross’s decision was
pretextual because “the rationale he provided for his decision was not his real
rationale.”132 Judge Furman, the U.S. District Judge who presided over the
case, asserted repeatedly that the Department had a duty to offer its actual

126. Am. Wildlands & Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., CV 97-160-M-DWM,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22243, at *9–10 (D. Mont. Apr. 14, 1999).
127. See id.
128. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2574 (2019).
129. See Sarah Paoletti, The Supreme Court Holds the Line on Truth over Pretext, REGUL. REV.
(July 15, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/15/paoletti-supreme-court-holds-line-truthpretext/ (describing the high political stakes of the decennial Census).
130. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551 (2019).
131. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 530–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
132. Id. at 635.
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rationale.133 It is clear from reading the district court opinion that Judge
Furman felt agencies must disclose the actual reason for their decision, not
simply a rational basis that did not reflect the true decision-making process.134
Judge Furman clarified that “a court cannot sustain agency action founded on
a pretextual or sham justification that conceals the true ‘basis’ for the
decision.”135 Adopting the district court’s rule would have required a
substantial revision to the existing APA judicial review process. Recall that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts should not overturn agency
action simply because the agency did not disclose all of its reasons for
acting.136 Requiring agencies to actually issue the truthful reason would
upend decades of caselaw.137
The Roberts opinion is best understood as stepping back from the major
changes the district court’s rule would have wrought. Roberts, writing for
himself and the four liberal justices who joined the pretext section of his
analysis, found a way to rule that the sort of pretext involved in this case
violated the APA, but established a doctrine vague enough that it could apply
to almost no cases or almost all cases.138 The opinion does not outline a clear
rule, but one can be discerned from the Chief Justice’s recitation of “settled”
propositions.139 The Roberts rule on pretext consists of a number of simple
statements which appear facially contradictory, but which can be reconciled
if considered with sufficient nuance. These statements are:
(1) Courts may not reject an agency’s stated rationale as arbitrary
and capricious because the agency also had “unstated reasons” for
acting.140

133. See, e.g., id. (“Similarly, if a plaintiff is able to prove that the agency’s stated reasons for
acting were not its ‘real’ reasons, then the plaintiff has proved that the agency’s decision was not
‘reasonably explained’ as the APA requires it to be.”).
134. Id. at 660 (“[T]he evidence is clear that Secretary Ross’s rationale was pretextual — that is,
that the real reason for his decision was something other than the sole reason he put forward in his
Memorandum, namely enhancement of DOJ’s VRA enforcement efforts. As the Court noted above,
judicial review of agency action ‘requires that the grounds upon which the . . . agency acted be
clearly disclosed.’”).
135. Id.
136. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019).
137. See, e.g., Jagers v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 758 F.3d 1179, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 2014)
(holding that a subjective desire to adopt a rule does not invalidate a result if objective evidence
supported the agency’s conclusion).
138. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019) (“[A]gencies must pursue their
goals reasonably. Reasoned decisionmaking under the Administrative Procedure Act calls for an
explanation for agency action. What was provided here was more of a distraction.”).
139. Id. at 2573–74.
140. Id.
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(2) Agencies must “disclose the basis” for their decisions.141
(3) “[A] court may not set aside an agency’s policymaking
decision solely because it might have been influenced by political
considerations” or other administration priorities.142
(4) Courts should only examine the actual “‘mental processes of
administrative decisionmakers’” if there has been a “‘strong
showing of bad faith or improper behavior.’”143
Statements (1) and (2) seem to be the most plainly at odds, but are not
when one considers the distinction between a basis and a reason. The basis
for an agency decision is the legal support on which the action is
established.144 The reason for the action is the cause that led to the effect of
the rule’s adoption.
Once one understands the distinction between “basis” and “reason,” the
Department of Commerce rule on pretext becomes much more intelligible.
A court may examine “the mental processes of [the agency] decisionmakers”
if there is “a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”145 Once that
showing has been made, the court can order discovery about the agency
decisionmaker’s process.146 If the agency’s stated reason played an
“insignificant” role in the decision, it is a pretextual action, and therefore in
violation of the APA.
While that rule may be doctrinally complicated, it is at least intelligible.
The district court’s rule was far simpler, but much further reaching—if the
rationale is not truthful, the agency’s action is invalid. Under that rule, if the
stated rationale plays some role in the decision-making process, but is not the
“main” reason for the action, the action can be overturned.
It is worth noting that the Roberts opinion does not spell this rule out.
Indeed, the opinion includes dicta that seems to promise a stricter rule than it
actually endorses. For example, Roberts wrote: “The reasoned explanation
requirement of administrative law . . . is meant to ensure that agencies offer
genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized
by courts and the interested public. Accepting contrived reasons would

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2753–74 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971)).
144. See Basis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/basis (last
visited May 20, 2021).
145. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
146. Id.
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defeat the purpose of the enterprise.”147 The overall impression of this quote
is that agencies have to be “genuine” in explaining their decisions, but
Roberts made clear earlier that courts should not overturn an agency action
if the agency has additional “unstated” reasons for acting.148 One could read
this dicta narrowly and keep it consistent with the overall rule by interpreting
“genuine justifications” as “justifications that played a role in the
decision.”149 That interpretation is, at best, strained and misleading, and at
worst a politician-like attempt to say something true only in a very narrow
sense. For example, a supervisor might fire an employee who refused his
romantic advances upon finding out she also had a bad performance
evaluation. The evaluation is relevant—the supervisor figured it would serve
as an adequate justification—but it is hard to call it a “genuine” justification.
There are other instances like this where Roberts’s opinion never quite
contradicts itself, but seems to overpromise the level of forthrightness to
which courts will hold agencies.150
2. Easy Facts on Pretext, Arguable Facts on Substance
The district court’s findings of fact made it relatively easy for the
Roberts pretext doctrine to invalidate the Commerce Department’s actions,
even under an ill-defined rule. By contrast, declaring the citizenship question
arbitrary and capricious on substance would have been more ideologically
challenging and required a greater degree of trust in expertise than Chief
Justice Roberts was comfortable with.151
Distilled down, the district court found that the Department had
conspired to produce a fake justification, then testified to Congress that the
fake justification was the only reason for the action. After producing an
administrative record for its decision, the Department filed a supplemental
memorandum in court to change incorrect assertions in the administrative
record.152 That supplemental memorandum made it easy to justify additional
discovery into the actual reasons for the decision.153 The subsequent
additional discovery produced a torrent of embarrassing emails and other

147. Id. at 2575–76.
148. Id. at 2573, 2575.
149. Id. at 2575.
150. See, e.g., id. at 2575 (“[T]he decision to reinstate a citizenship question cannot be
adequately explained in terms of DOJ’s request for improved citizenship data to better enforce the
VRA,” suggesting that the proffered explanation must adequately explain the action taken.).
151. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
7 (2019) (describing the Roberts Court’s distrust of administrative power).
152. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
153. Id. at 548.
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documents showing the conscious development of a pretextual rationale,
even when the case was pending before the Supreme Court.154
In the district court’s telling, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross
announced on March 26, 2018 that he would add a citizenship question to the
2020 Census in response to a December 12, 2017 request from the
Department of Justice for better citizenship data to help it enforce Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) of 1965.155 The Secretary “testified before
Congress, under oath, that DOJ’s request was the ‘sole[]’ reason for his
decision.”156 Then, in a “Supplemental Memorandum,” the Secretary said he
began considering “whether to reinstate a citizenship question” soon after his
appointment.157 He also said that he and his staff already thought the
citizenship question could be warranted and “inquired whether the
Department of Justice . . . would support, and if so would request, inclusion
of a citizenship question.”158
This supplemental memorandum led the court to authorize further
discovery, which found that the Secretary and his aides had gone to
“extraordinary lengths” to “generate a request for the question.” 159 Ross had
reportedly requested a citizenship question as early as March 10, 2017 and
then sent a follow up email in May asking why nothing had been done.160
One of the Secretary’s aides “set out to find a ‘legal rationale’” regardless of
whether it was the actual reason for acting.161 Those efforts included advising
and ghostwriting for DOJ personnel completely separate from enforcement
of the VRA.162 After Attorney General Jeff Sessions directed DOJ personnel
to send the VRA request letter, he then prohibited DOJ personnel from
meeting with Census Bureau personnel to discuss alternative ways to obtain
citizenship data other than a citizenship question on the Census.163
All of the above points to the VRA explanation being pretextual, but
does not necessarily prove that the VRA explanation would otherwise be
arbitrary or capricious, which was why Chief Justice Roberts had to reach the
pretext question in the first place. The liberal Justices pointed to additional

154. See Hansi Lo Wang, Emails Connect Census Official with GOP Strategist on Citizenship
Question, NPR (June 15, 2019, 4:16 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/15/732669380/
emails-connect-census-official-with-gop-strategist-on-citizenship-question.
155. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d at 515.
156. Id. at 664.
157. Id. at 547–48.
158. Id. at 548 (alterations in original).
159. Id. at 663.
160. Id. at 549–50.
161. Id. at 551.
162. Id. at 555.
163. Id. at 556, 557.
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evidence suggesting the Census Bureau itself argued against adding a
citizenship question, which would increase costs significantly and yield
worse data.164 Meanwhile, DOJ’s request for data to enforce the VRA could
be met in other ways.165 However, Chief Justice Roberts believed that the
Secretary could have still preferred the citizenship question to enforce the
VRA because it would have reduced the number of people for whom the
Census Bureau would have to estimate citizenship due to a lack of other
available public records.166 The Census Bureau claimed it could develop a
model to estimate the citizenship of that population accurately, but Chief
Justice Roberts pointed out that it did not yet have such a model.167 Thus, in
Chief Justice Roberts’s view, the Secretary could have decided a model might
not work, and thus a citizenship question was warranted.168
One can sense from the opinion how uncomfortable Chief Justice
Roberts was with the idea of declaring a citizenship question arbitrary and
capricious. To do so would seem to flout common sense—how can a court
find it totally unreasonable to ask a citizenship question when many other
countries do so, the United States itself did so for many years, and the
democratically-accountable administration has clearly made immigration
enforcement an issue of paramount importance?169 Against all that is the thin
reed that experts at the Census Bureau claimed they could do the stated job
of VRA enforcement better with a statistical model, something the average
citizen can barely wrap their mind around.170 Even if the experts are right, as
seems quite likely from the facts, a Republican-appointed judge unfamiliar
with statistics siding with agency experts over traditional common sense is
unlikely to the point of futility.
The easy facts on pretext and difficult facts on substance made this an
ideal case for pretext doctrine. In its supplemental memorandum, the
Department admitted that it had not told the whole truth about the
development of its rationale, a seemingly obvious showing of bad faith in the
original rulemaking.171 With that bad faith showing, the district court could
inquire into the Department’s actual decision-making process. The timeline
of events in this case showed that the VRA rationale came well after the

164. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2590–91 (2019).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2569–70.
167. Id. at 2570.
168. Id. at 2570–71.
169. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2596 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
170. Id. at 2570.
171. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 547–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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Secretary had effectively made up his mind.172 The sole stated reason thus
did not appear to play any role in the Department’s decision. Ergo, under the
Roberts doctrine, the rationale was pretextual, and the rulemaking was
invalid.
3. The Thomas Opinion
Setting rhetoric aside, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Gorsuch and
Kavanaugh, disagreed on two factual points made in the Roberts opinion: (1)
that there had been an adequate showing of bad faith to justify an inquiry into
the Secretary’s decision-making process;173 and (2) that the Department’s
stated rationale played no role in the actual decision-making.174 While Justice
Alito wrote a separate opinion, it is of little consequence to the question of
pretext, so I will focus my analysis on the Thomas opinion.175
On the first point, Justice Thomas could not quite bring himself to say
that there was no bad faith in the Commerce Department’s process.176 The
evidence presented was simply not a “strong showing.”177 What would
constitute a strong showing is never explained. The single most important
sentence in understanding why Justice Thomas found no bad faith is a bit of
grumpy dicta:
Echoing the din of suspicion and distrust that seems to typify
modern discourse, the Court declares the Secretary’s memorandum
“pretextual” because, “viewing the evidence as a whole,” his
explanation that including a citizenship question on the census
would help enforce the Voting Rights Act (VRA) “seems to have
been contrived.”178
The cri de coeur here expresses a simple point: If people were more
trusting, as they should be, the Court would not have made such an erroneous
ruling. Justice Thomas trusted Secretary Ross sufficiently that he believed
the evidence presented in this case should not have triggered an examination
of pretext.
172. Id.
173. Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2580.
174. Id. at 2581.
175. Justice Alito, writing only for himself, seems to have filed a separate opinion for two
reasons: (1) to emphasize the policy arguments for asking a citizenship question; and (2) to argue
that the APA should not apply to this particular agency action because the statute explicitly
empowers the Secretary of Commerce to decide which questions to include on the Census. Id. at
2597–98 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Neither point is particularly important
for purposes of this article.
176. See id. at 2580 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This evidence fails
to make a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior.”).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2576.
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To Justice Thomas, the evidence that the Secretary already decided to
add a citizenship question could be explained away with three rebuttals: (1)
Ross’s emails showed an inclination to add a citizenship question rather than
a decision; (2) Ross subsequently changed agency policy to use additional
methods of data collection; and (3) the presumption of regularity ordinarily
owed to agencies requires resolving any uncertainty in favor of the
agencies.179 Unless the presumption of regularity means judges can never
review for pretext—and Thomas remains barely agnostic on that point—
Justice Thomas’s disagreements with Chief Justice Roberts are factual, not
doctrinal.
Justice Thomas’s argument that there was no evidence that the
Department’s stated rationale played no role at all in the actual decisionmaking is mystifying if taken practically. However, it makes more sense if
viewed philosophically. From a practical standpoint, the district court found
that the VRA rationale played no role at all in the actual decision-making.180
The Court reviewed that factual determination under the “clearly erroneous”
standard.181 Justice Thomas’s opinion cited no evidence that VRA
enforcement did factor into the Secretary’s decision, so it is difficult to see
where the district court was “clearly erroneous.”
From a more philosophical perspective, deciding whether some factor
played a role in a decision depends on when exactly the decision is made. If
the decision is made when the Secretary signs off on the final printing of the
rule, then the pretextual rationale will always play a significant role—the
Secretary probably would not have signed the rule unless he thought it could
survive legal scrutiny, so he did consider the rationale as part of his decision.
This is the essence of Justice Thomas’s point that Secretary Ross changed the
plan slightly late in the process, after the VRA rationale was supplied to
him.182 In that way, the VRA rationale affected the final decision to print the
rule. On the other hand, if the “decision” is made when the Secretary was
irrevocably committed to taking the action, that is truly an impossible
moment to determine. This is a problem we will examine more fully later in
the Article, but for now it suffices to observe that an agency cannot truly
commit to an action in any way other than issuing the final rule.183
Justice Thomas’s opinion attacked the idea of pretext doctrine mainly
through tone rather than clear disagreement. At several points, he used
rhetoric suggesting that he thought courts should not examine pretext, but he
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 2581–83.
New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2565.
Id. at 2582.
See infra Part I.F.4.
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never quite said they should not. He noted: “For the first time ever, the Court
invalidates an agency action solely because it questions the sincerity of the
agency’s otherwise adequate rationale.”184 He criticized the Court’s
“unprecedented departure from our deferential review of discretionary
agency decisions.”185 With consequentialist reasoning of the sort he
ordinarily criticizes, he worried that the decision “would transform
administrative law” and lead to “an endless morass of discovery and policy
disputes not contemplated by the [APA].”186 As for actual discussion of
pretext doctrine, Justice Thomas said: “Under ‘settled propositions of
administrative law’ . . . pretext is virtually never an appropriate or relevant
inquiry for a reviewing court to undertake.”187 In terms of literal meaning,
“virtually never” is synonymous with “sometimes, but rarely.” Therefore,
Justice Thomas tacitly agreed with Chief Justice Roberts’s pretext doctrine
by restating it with different emphasis.
4. Loose End: When is an Agency Decision “Made” for Purposes of
Pretext?
The more one examines Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, the harder it is
to explain how the Department’s action could be pretextual but not arbitrary
and capricious. How could a decision based on no legally sufficient factor
not be arbitrary and capricious? The heart of the apparent discrepancy seems
to be inconsistency over what specific decision is being reviewed in either
pretext doctrine or arbitrary and capricious review. Chief Justice Roberts
concluded that the Department’s VRA explanation was pretextual because
the email evidence indicated that the Secretary had effectively already made
up his mind and was merely seeking cover for it.188 In that interpretation of
the facts, the decision to adopt the Census question was made at a point when
the VRA explanation did not even exist. Presumably, that decision was made
without consideration of relevant facts because it seemed to predate the
Department’s consideration of VRA enforcement.189 The Court has
established that failure to consider relevant facts is arbitrary and
capricious.190 However, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion held that adding the
Census question was not arbitrary and capricious because the VRA

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 2576.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2579.
Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2575.
See id.
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
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explanation was sufficient.191 That analysis suggests that the relevant
decision was the Department’s publishing of the final rule in the Federal
Register. Justice Thomas also used the Department’s publishing of the final
rule as the moment of decision to argue that the VRA explanation was not
pretextual.192
There is not necessarily a clear right or wrong answer for which decision
is more important. However, evaluating pretext based on the final decision
to publish would defeat the purpose of pretext review. There is some value
in choosing the final decision to sign off on and publish the rule—it is a
clearly identifiable moment, and it is the only one that actually triggers
regulatory consequences.193 However, that moment is not particularly
relevant in determining actual motives. Indeed, it would be difficult for an
agency to ever run afoul of a rule against pretext if the only measuring
moment was the final filing—the agency would have its pretext in hand when
it issues the rule. Arguably, an agency head who openly orders a subordinate
to concoct a fake explanation prior to the actual issuance of the order would
be acceptable because he at least considered the pretextual explanation prior
to the “decision.” Pretext doctrine only really makes logical sense if we think
the real decision was made before the pretext was devised.
It could be that arbitrary and capricious review and pretext review are
focused on different things and thus different decision points should be
evaluated. If one conceives of arbitrary and capricious review as observing
the formalities of rulemaking and pretext review as getting at harder to
perceive process fouls, it would make sense for the former to focus on the
final decision and the latter to survey the process as a whole. Regardless of
the decision point chosen, future cases will have to make clear which is being
evaluated.
5. Loose End: What is the Statutory Basis for Pretext Review?
A first-semester law student reading Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
would struggle to answer a simple question: What specific provision of law
is Chief Justice Roberts alleging that the Department of Commerce
violated?194 As discussed above, the APA does not explicitly cover “pretext,”
191. Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2570.
192. Id. at 2580.
193. See “A Guide to the Rulemaking Process,” Office of the Federal Register, at 11,
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf.
194. Indeed, the Harvard Law Review’s case summary asserts confidently that the basis of the
decision was not the arbitrary and capricious standard, though the Roberts opinion never clearly
states that. See Census Act—Review of Administrative Action—Judicial Review of Pretext—
Department of Commerce v. New York, 133 HARV. L. REV. 372 (2019),
https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/11/department-of-commerce-v-new-york/.
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and seemingly the only logical provision that would apply is judicial review
of agency actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of
discretion.”195 The district court in Department of Commerce, however,
found that the decision to add a citizenship question rather than collect data
through “more effective and less costly means” was arbitrary and capricious,
and independently found that the decision was pretextual.196 The court
organized various arbitrary and capricious violations in one section of the
decision, and fielded the pretext argument in a separate section.197 The
pretext section cites no specific statutory basis for ruling the citizenship
question invalid, but does cite Supreme Court cases from 1943 and 1962 for
the proposition that “judicial review of agency action ‘requires that the
grounds upon which the . . . agency acted be clearly disclosed.’”198 Chief
Justice Roberts’s opinion held that the Secretary’s decision was “not arbitrary
and capricious,” but upheld the district court’s ruling on pretext.199 Justice
Thomas’s dissent noted that the Supreme Court has “never held an agency
decision arbitrary and capricious on the ground that its supporting rationale
was ‘pretextual.’”200
This loose end may ultimately prove more interesting for its political
implications than for its effect on cases. Why does it matter what specific
part of the APA was violated if the ultimate outcome remains the same? As
with a murder mystery, we can attempt to answer this question by examining
motives. Why would the district court separate pretext from arbitrary and
capricious review? One possible reason is that courts endlessly restate how
deferential arbitrary and capricious review is.201 If “pretext” is not a subset
of arbitrary and capricious review, then the agency does not necessarily
warrant the same deference in the pretext analysis. Setting pretext apart
allows the Court to uphold the pretext holding without flouting the high
deference normally paid to agencies. The Court also then has a middle
ground between finding the action arbitrary and capricious and upholding it
altogether.
Chief Justice Roberts faced a different set of incentives for separating
pretext and arbitrary and capricious review. As described above, this case
195. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
196. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
197. Id. at 514.
198. Id. at 660 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) and Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167–68 (1962)).
199. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2572–74 (2019).
200. Id. at 2579.
201. The Chief Justice himself characterized it as “deferential,” and Justice Thomas used
precisely the same word, citing previous cases. Id. at 2575 (majority opinion); id. at 2576 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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not only presented a bad set of facts for the Department, but also a tough set
of facts for a Republican appointee. The Chief Justice may have wanted to
reverse the agency action in this case because of how egregious it was,
without forbidding a citizenship question in the future. Making a ruling
based on pretext also limits the precedential impact of this case. Arbitrary
and capricious review, after all, applies to virtually every administrative law
case. The relatively newfangled pretext review only triggers where there is
a showing of bad faith, something that has more often been an issue during
the Trump administration.202 This theory is essentially what Justice Thomas
was suggesting when he said the Court was applying “an administrationspecific standard.”203
6. Loose End: How Can an Agency Fix a Rule Struck Down for
Pretext?
While the rule on pretext emerging from Department of Commerce is
not prohibitively difficult to discern, at least three messy problems are
evident in the ruling: (1) what is the ultimate remedy for a pretextual agency
action; (2) realistically, how can we ever be certain that a consideration
played no role in agency decision-making; and (3) does the Roberts pretext
doctrine provide the best practicable rule? The latter two questions are
complicated enough that they will be addressed at length later in the
Article,204 but the first is an immediate practical issue in the Department of
Commerce case.
In Department of Commerce, the Court ultimately remanded the case
back to the Department for further development of the administrative record,
which comports with the ordinary result when plaintiffs win an APA arbitrary
and capricious claim against an agency.205 There are exceptions to the
general rule, however. If a court finds that the record does not support an
agency’s decision, but the record is “fully developed,” there is no point in
remanding.206 This raises the pertinent issue for pretext analysis: What is the
point in remanding? In a somewhat similar 2009 district court case, the court
justified remanding to the agency for further consideration because there was
a new agency head who could, presumably, clear up the issue of pretext.207
202. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
203. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2576.
204. See Part II.A.
205. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
206. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 346 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).
207. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), amended sub nom. Tummino
v. Hamburg, No. 05-CV-366 ERK VVP, 2013 WL 865851 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013). The court
also cited the expertise of the agency in question (the FDA) as a reason to remand, though that factor
obviously did not prevent the court from remanding in the first place. Id.
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It is easier to recite the current status of the citizenship question
litigation than to explain what the agency can or cannot do now. The
controlling opinion for Department of Commerce affirmed the ruling of the
district court on pretext. The federal government conceded at the district
court level that if the decision was ruled pretextual, it “would be a basis for”
relief under the APA.208 The rule has been remanded back to the Department
to provide a non-pretextual rationale.209 Practically speaking, it is too late to
add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census, so the issue is moot. However,
if there is to be a logical doctrine of pretext, a court will eventually have to
decide what, if anything, an agency can do to cure a rule overturned under
pretext doctrine.
6.1. Option 1: Agency Can Reissue the Rule Immediately with a
Minimal Additional Paper Trail
Chief Justice Roberts and the four other conservative justices have
already declared the Department’s stated rationale acceptable except for the
pretext problem.210 However, pretext is only examined if there has been a
previous showing of bad faith in the rulemaking process. The Department
could, in theory, put all the discovery from the first rulemaking into a new
administrative record, add an explanation that it has now thoroughly
considered the matter, cite a few pieces of new evidence, and add a
citizenship question again. It would be difficult to see where the showing of
bad faith would come from in that case. In essence, the Secretary would be
declaring: “This explanation was originally pretextual, but I have considered
it thoroughly, and for this new rulemaking, it is the true, accurate reason why
I am taking this action.” President Trump could have even replaced Wilbur
Ross with a new Secretary to thoroughly disinfect the original pretext
problem.
Recall that in Department of Commerce’s lower court proceedings,
Judge Furman stated that “there is no basis in the record to conclude that
Secretary Ross ‘actually believe[d]’ the rationale he put forward, . . . and a
solid basis to conclude that he did not.” 211 On a hypothetical second goaround, the Secretary could simply state repeatedly that he viewed VRA
enforcement as crucial. He could ask for detailed memos on the subject of
VRA enforcement. He could engage in theater sufficiently elaborate such
that any judge would be forced to admit there is at least some basis to
conclude the Secretary actually believed the VRA enforcement rationale.
208.
209.
210.
211.

New York v. Dep’t of Com., 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
Id. at 673.
Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2571, 2576–77, 2596,
Id. at 664 (internal citation omitted).
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While this might seem a cynical response to the pretext ruling, there is
no obvious reason it would not suffice. Given that five justices have
approved the stated rationale for the citizenship question, it seems obvious
that VRA enforcement played some role in the agency’s final publication of
the citizenship question. If a new rulemaking begins with the VRA
enforcement rationale already in hand, the explanation is not obviously
pretextual under the Roberts doctrine. This option also mirrors what happens
to most rules remanded to agencies for arbitrariness: Agencies usually end
up achieving the same goal after remand; they simply have to go through the
regulatory process again and remedy whatever procedural defect led to the
remand in the first instance.212
6.2. Option 2: Agency Can Reissue the Rule Eventually if it Cites
a Different Explanation
Courts could be strict and decide that a rule based on a pretextual
rationale cannot be re-issued soon after being rejected. Applied to the
Department of Commerce case, the pretext doctrine might have prohibited
the Trump Commerce Department from simply using the same voting rights
explanation for a citizenship question on the Census, but a future presidency
(or agency head) not tainted by bad-faith process could use that explanation.
While this precise scenario has not arisen, in at least one case, a court found
the replacement of an agency head a relevant step in curing a bad-faith
process.213
While it would be difficult to enforce strict boundaries on such a
doctrine, it would also not be difficult for a hypothetical future Trump
Commerce Department to avoid the doctrine’s teeth. The Thomas and Alito
opinions both hint that a national security explanation for a citizenship
question would pass muster.214 With a minimal amount of competence, the
Department could ask the FBI or CIA for data on crimes or espionage
activities by foreigners in the United States, note that citizenship data could
be useful in more efficiently distributing funding for anti-espionage law
enforcement or preventing crimes by non-citizens, and reissue the rule.
Like Option 1, Option 2 raises questions about the purpose of pretext
review. Effectively, it would be a penalty of time, not substance. The
agencies would have to jump through some paperwork hoops to reach a

212. William S. Jordan, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal
Rulemaking? 60 (Draft Paper, 1998), https://ssrn.com/abstract=140798.
213. See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
214. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2581, 2596 (2019) (“No one disputes that it
is important to know how many inhabitants of this country are citizens.”).
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predetermined conclusion later than they would have if the courts had not
reviewed for pretext in the first place.
6.3. Option 3: The Agency Cannot Reissue the Rule
The Roberts pretext doctrine, as applied by lower courts, could prevent
an agency from issuing a substantively identical rule that has been previously
disqualified on grounds of pretext, even if it offers a different rationale the
second time around.215 This is obviously the most draconian possible
outcome, but consider that the other two options discussed essentially lead to
the agency putting the same rule in place after conducting a paperwork
exercise. A competent agency would be able to issue a new administrative
record and avoid the bad faith indicia the district court uncovered in the case
of the citizenship question. One could argue that the only way to give the
doctrine teeth is to prevent agencies from easily remedying the flaws
identified in court.
The problem with this approach is that it explicitly allows courts to
overturn good, substantively justified policies simply because the agency
acted in an underhanded way at some point in the past. The courts would be
depriving the country at-large of the benefits of whatever policy is being
considered. Of course, if agencies had resorted to pretextual rationales for
the rule, it is more likely that the rule itself would not bring tremendous
benefits—if there were obvious benefits, why not just cite those as the
rationale in the first place? Nevertheless, to the extent an agency rule would
be justified but for pretext, there is likely some cost to judicial intervention.216
Lower courts have not yet made significant progress in sketching out a
rule of pretext, but it seems likely that various lower courts would choose all
of the possible options.217 However, it will take quite some time before a
clear split emerges simply because of the cumbersome rulemaking and
judicial review process. In Department of Commerce, the Court’s ruling
came over two years after the Secretary started asking his staff to come up
with some rationale for a citizenship question that would survive judicial

215. This would be similar to the consequences of an agency action being overturned by the
Congressional Review Act. The agency is barred from re-issuing the same rule. See 5 U.S.C.
§§801–8.
216. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2571 (expounding on the downside of
substituting a court’s judgment for an agency’s).
217. Courts addressing pretext in cases since 2019 have mostly done so in the course of
authorizing additional discovery, not in actually disposing of a case. See, e.g., Sweet v. Devos, No.
C 19-03674 WHA, 2020 WL 6149690, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020) (authorizing expedited
discovery); see also Cook Cty., Illinois v. Wolf, 461 F. Supp. 3d 779, 795 (N.D. Ill. 2020), motion
to certify appeal denied, No. 19 C 6334, 2020 WL 3975466 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2020) (authorizing
additional discovery because of the suspicion of pretext).
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scrutiny.218 Putting aside the fact that the proximity of the 2020 Census made
new action virtually impossible, if another agency facing a similar decision
on pretext had to come up with a new rule, it might take another two years to
reach a final litigation outcome. Even if that agency takes less time for its
rulemaking the second time around, a new president might come into office
and scuttle the effort anyway.219
II. WHAT PRETEXT ACTUALLY MEANS AND WHY IT MATTERS
It may seem strange that one can discuss the case law around pretext in
agency rulemaking without fully understanding what “pretext” would mean
in this context or why anyone should worry about it in the first place. As we
have seen, the concept is new enough that its contours have not been defined
in any meaningful way by the courts.220 Now that the Supreme Court has
ruled that pretext can violate the APA, litigants will map the borders of
pretext in subsequent cases. By thoroughly examining the meaning now, we
can foresee where courts may eventually draw those borders. The single
largest, seemingly insurmountable, philosophical problem with agency
pretext is that an entire organization rarely has a unified reason for its action.
The President, the agency head, the political staff, and the career staff at an
agency all may have different reasons for acting, creating complicated
mixtures of legitimate and illegitimate rationales.221 Some agency practices
that seem like obvious examples of pretextual reasoning are more pernicious
than others. Ultimately, my proposed solution is to find impermissible
pretext only where there is strong evidence that the impetus for change came
from the higher echelons of agency authority for reasons unrelated to the
legally acceptable explanation supplied from lower political and career staff.
A. What is “Pretext” for Agencies?
Establishing exactly what we mean by “pretext” for agencies is far more
complicated than what it means for an individual. The word “pretext” is
loaded with connotations, but simply denotes “a purpose or motive alleged
or an appearance assumed in order to cloak the real intention or state of
218. Dep’t of Com. V. New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2574 (describing the Secretary’s efforts as
beginning when he entered office, which was in January 2017).
219. President Biden has already withdrawn several Trump-era rules. See, e.g., Independent
Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): Withdrawal, Federal Register, 86
FR 24303 (May 6, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/05/06/202109518/independent-contractor-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-flsa-withdrawal.
220. See supra Part I.
221. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2573 (stating that agency policymaking
decisions can be affected by political considerations or presidential interest without violating the
APA).
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affairs.”222 Black’s Law Dictionary offers: “A false or weak reason or motive
advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive.”223 When applied to
an individual, a “pretext” is merely a specific kind of lie, specifically a lie
about the reason the individual took an action. The concept of pretext
presupposes that individuals can meaningfully discern their “true” reason or
reasons for taking an action. While some scientists might contest that
assertion,224 many areas of criminal and civil law have already established
doctrines for discerning an individual’s reasons for acting.225 An agency writ
large does not have the same unified will as an individual. While agencies
do offer a clear stated rationale for rules, it is not clear how one would
identify a “true” rationale.
The following five scenarios illustrate the difficulty in discerning
pretext in agency actions:
Scenario 1. A President wants to damage a political rival who owns a
coal mining company. He directs the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), in explicit terms, to create a rule that would hurt the rival’s
company. The EPA Administrator comes up with an idea for a rule and
directs her staff to produce a cost-benefit analysis. The analysis shows the
rule would be beneficial. The Administrator decides to issue the rule. EPA’s
various Federal Record publications make no mention of the presidential
directive.
Scenario 1 is the most straightforward example imaginable, but even
this scenario has room for ambiguity. The “action” that must be explained is
the issuance of the rule. By common understanding and dictionary definition,
the EPA’s explanation for why it took the action is a pretext—it does not
disclose the true motivation. Intuitively, we know the true reason is that the
President ordered the EPA to issue the rule, and the Administrator knew she
was taking the action for illicit reasons. There is a nagging unknown in this
scenario, however: the cost-benefit analysis gave a potentially independent
reason to issue the rule. It is indeterminate whether the president’s order by
itself caused the Administrator to issue the rule, or whether the subsequent
analysis caused the Administrator to issue the rule. We might surmise that
the analysis was influenced by a desire to obtain a certain outcome, a situation
222. Pretext, Miriam Webster Online (last visited May 20, 2021), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/pretext.
223. Pretext, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
224. See, e.g., Kerri Smith, Brain Makes Decisions Before You Even Know It, NATURE (Apr. 11,
2008), https://www.nature.com/news/2008/080411/full/news.2008.751.html.
225. To take one obvious example, the difference between first and second-degree murder in
many jurisdictions hinges on the offender’s motive. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2020)
(defining first degree murder as “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” and second degree
murder as all other kinds of murder).
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that true scientists work painstakingly to avoid. However, we do not know
at the outset if EPA would have ultimately taken the same action if the
analysis had come out differently.
It is not clear under the Roberts doctrine announced in Department of
Commerce whether this would constitute an example of pretext that would
violate the APA.226 First, a litigant would need to find evidence of bad faith
by the EPA. Note that the EPA did not necessarily show bad faith here—the
President did when he ordered the EPA to hurt his rival’s company. The
Administrator simply came up with an idea and had an analysis drawn up.
Assuming that a court would find bad faith in the process, the court could
authorize investigation of the Administrator’s mental state. If the court found
that the Administrator felt justified in issuing the rule based on the costbenefit analysis, it would not matter under the Roberts doctrine whether she
also acted because the President told her to.
Scenario 2. The Secretary of Homeland Security feels a deep moral
obligation to help victims of a hurricane in another country. She assigns her
staff to devise a rationale for why granting victims of a hurricane Temporary
Protected Status in the United States is in the national interest.227 Her staff
comes up with a national security justification that plays no role in the
Secretary’s decision. When asked by Congress why she offered the aid, she
offers only the national security explanation.
Scenario 2 is essentially a benign pretext, which raises the question of
whether a pretext must be nefarious to warrant scrutiny. On one hand,
excusing this scenario’s explanation as benign raises thorny moral and
methodological problems. Immigration opponents frequently rail against
Temporary Protected Status;228 to them, the action would not seem benign at
all. Allowing judges to decide for themselves what motivations are benign
is, at best, anti-democratic. At worst, it gives a judge’s moral intuitions the
force of law. On the other hand, punishing benign pretexts raises a fair
question: What motivations are not, at some level, pretextual? The scenario
stipulates that the head of the Agency feels a moral compulsion to help
victims of natural disasters. But what if she developed that moral intuition
by seeing through years of experience that the benefits of aid outweigh the
costs? After all, if morality is a coarsely calibrated cost-benefit analysis, why
226. See supra Part I.F.1.
227. Temporary Protected Status protects a foreign national from removal from the United States
and makes them eligible for employment authorization. See Temporary Protected Status, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protectedstatus (last accessed May 20, 2021).
228. See, e.g., Andrew R. Arthur, ‘Temporary’ Protected Status: The Biggest Misnomer in
Immigration, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (October 31, 2017), https://cis.org/Arthur/TemporaryProtected-Status-Biggest-Misnomer-Immigration.

1058

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1021

should it be disqualifying if her moral hunch is subsequently confirmed by a
more rigorous analysis? One can resolve this dilemma only by a complicated
hierarchy of pretexts, where venal pretexts like personal gain receive closer
scrutiny than seemingly benign pretexts.
This is one of the hardest scenarios to evaluate under the Roberts
doctrine from Department of Commerce. Could there truly be a showing of
bad faith in a case like this, which would be the prerequisite to even
entertaining a pretext allegation? I could not find any case like this, most
likely because few people would sue an agency for acting on a humanitarian
impulse. However, if offering deliberately misleading explanations counts
as “bad faith,” then such an action could be invalidated on pretext grounds.
Scenario 3. An opportunistic politician secured her party’s nomination
for President by promising to do something about climate change despite
having no personal feelings one way or the other on the subject. Once elected
President, she directs the EPA to write a rule limiting carbon emissions. The
EPA writes an exhaustive justification for the action and conducts a thorough
cost-benefit analysis and citing hundreds of authoritative scientific studies
suggesting the action is necessary to avert catastrophe.
This scenario blurs the lines of personal and public motivations. At one
level, the opportunistic politician’s motivation is venal and personal—she
wants to maintain power by issuing the rule. However, maintaining an
alliance of disparate interest groups is essentially the function of a politician
in a democratic system. Functionally, there is no difference between a
principled politician whose views happen to align with enough interest
groups to constitute a majority and a pandering politician who manages to
satisfy enough interest groups to constitute a majority. The EPA’s
explanation is obviously pretextual in the sense that neutral rationale did not
originally motivate the action, but it is not at all clear whether we should
consider this a “benign” pretext.
The role of “bad faith” in the Roberts doctrine and its predecessors plays
a key role here. If bad faith is simply misstating the rationale for why
something happened, then this action could be reviewed on pretext grounds.
If judges are allowed to decide for themselves that certain motives do not
constitute bad faith, then pretext would not enter into the picture. Of course,
that outcome would open up another can of worms—what motivations do not
count as “bad faith”? Are judges allowed to be more sympathetic to a cause
that experts generally champion—like action on climate change—than base,
populist actions like a citizenship question on the Census?
Scenario 4. The President appoints a popular figure with little expertise
to serve as Secretary of the Interior. Career employees at the Department of
the Interior inform the Secretary that they have conducted careful research
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and think the Department should disallow the use of jet skis on waterways
within parks owned by the federal government. The Secretary has no opinion
on the subject, but issues the suggested order because he does not want to
antagonize the career employees.
Like Scenario 3, this set of facts lays bare difficult ambiguities with
motivations, but in a subtle manner. An initial question emerges: Whose
motivation actually matters for determining whether an explanation was
pretextual? The Secretary is the actual decisionmaker, and there are several
equally true ways to describe his motivation: (a) he issued the rule for venal
personal gain because he wanted to curry favor with the career employees;
(b) he relied on the expert opinion of career employees in exactly the
technocratic way one would theoretically want; and (c) he acted randomly in
that he did not particularly care what the rule was, just whether the career
employees liked it. If we look to the agency writ large instead of the actual
decisionmaker, we might be able to fashion a coherent explanation. The
Department’s motive as an organization was the ostensibly neutral, expert
opinion of the career employees—their opinion drove the Secretary. Note
that this way of looking at the problem only works if we view the
Department’s employees as faceless automatons. If the record revealed that
the expert career employees had their own motivations for their
recommendations, the entire pretext discussion would begin anew, but even
further removed from the actual decisionmaker.
The Roberts doctrine does not offer a clear answer on this scenario.
First, there is the same question raised in previous scenarios as to whether
there could be a showing of “bad faith.” Assuming there is such a showing,
the second question is whether the public rationale played a role in the
decision, and the answer is a resounding “it depends.” Did the Secretary
consider the rationale, or did he merely consider the fact that his career staff
had recommended it? Is there some requirement that the decisionmaker have
an understanding of the substance of the rationale rather than simply the
identity of the people who recommended it? This may seem like a contrived
scenario, but agency decisionmakers make many decisions based on the
advice of career staff for the obvious reason that the career staff know far
more about the nuts-and-bolts of the issue area.
Scenario 5. The President appoints a conscientious scientist to serve as
Administrator of the EPA. News reports indicate a chemical in a lawn care
product called RoundDown may cause cancer. The Administrator tells his
underlings to conduct a detailed study on whether the chemical should be
banned. He fully intends to follow their recommendation. On the day their
report is due, the President tweets, “I never liked RoundDown because the
company that makes it once sued my company. I am hereby ordering EPA
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to ban RoundDown. Take that, losers!” Right after the administrator reads
the tweet, he opens the report and learns that the EPA staff recommended
banning RoundDown.
This is the true nightmare scenario philosophically. If the action
proceeds, it is very difficult for anyone to credibly believe agency
justifications. Legally speaking, the Administrator issues the rules, not the
President, so theoretically his opinion is not relevant.229 But that is a very
thin reed in the real world, where the President can remove almost all officers
in the federal government for virtually any reason whatsoever. If he does not
want to remove an officer, he can practically eliminate their authority through
public shaming or controlling access to resources.230 Indeed, the unitary
executive theory suggests that all inferior officers of the government must be
exercising the President’s will. If the EPA Administrator is not implementing
the President’s will, where did the Administrator derive the power to execute
the law?
It seems obvious that there is bad faith occurring in this scenario, but it
would depend on how courts view the role of the President in administrative
decision-making. In theory, the EPA Administrator does not have to follow
the President’s orders, but the President can also simply remove the
Administrator whenever he wants. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say
that the President strongly recommends that the EPA take an action. If we
focus on why the Administrator takes action, there is presumably a record in
this scenario indicating that the Administrator is acting, at least in part, based
on the legal rationale. Under the Roberts doctrine, if the legal rationale plays
at least some role in the decision-making process, then the rule stands even if
there are other unspoken reasons.231 However, one could imagine a more
difficult scenario where the EPA is in the middle of evaluating the facts when
the President orders the EPA to take action.
To summarize, these scenarios present a number of conceptual
difficulties with “pretext.” First, what decision are we seeking the true
explanation for—the decision to embark upon making a rule, or the decision
to issue a final rule? Second, should we consider an explanation pretextual
if there is any alternative consideration not disclosed by the agency, even a
seemingly moral one? Third, does any hidden rationale constitute bad faith,
including a decisionmaker’s potential apathy or deference to career

229. This is why the discussion in Department of Commerce focused on the Secretary’s
motivations, not the President’s.
230. See, e.g., Dan Mangan and Kevin Breuninger, Trump Tweets: ‘Disgraceful’ that Sessions
Kicked Surveillance Probe to Obama Appointee, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2018) (noting the President’s
public criticism of his Attorney General).
231. See supra Part I.F.1.
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employees? Finally, can a true, acceptable explanation be rendered
pretextual through the interjection of a political actor such as the President or
an agency head?
A common law of “pretext” could emerge where judges answer at least
some of these questions. Perhaps agency action will be considered pretextual
only if the actual dominant motivation is unacceptably unrelated to the legal
motivation. With that many layers of imprecise verbiage, however, finding
pretext might simply indicate that a judge strongly disagrees with the
underlying motivation.
III. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST PRETEXT DOCTRINE
As the above scenarios illustrate, there are major philosophical
ambiguities in pretext doctrine. That may explain why administrative law
has been around for about a century without ever addressing the idea of
pretext. Given that courts did not feel a need for it until now, we must
critically examine why the doctrine is necessary. Some scholars argue that
the Trump administration was uniquely incompetent or villainous.232 The
dissenters in Department of Commerce seemed to indicate that there should
be no pretext doctrine, at least not one imposed by the courts alone.233 Even
the four liberal justices who signed on to Chief Justice Roberts’s pretext
analysis indicated they would have held that the citizenship question was
arbitrary and capricious regardless of whether it was pretextual.234 One could
thus read Department of Commerce as showing that only one Justice thought
a pretext doctrine was necessary to decide the outcome of the case.
A. If There’s an Otherwise Adequate Legal Rationale, Why Should We
Care About the Actual Rationale?
Those who think federal courts should not examine agency rationales
for pretext can muster a strong, simple argument. At best, pretext doctrine
punishes the country at-large for the thought crimes of the agencies. At
worst, the doctrine is so vague as to invite reversal of virtually any rule a
court disagrees with. The following premises are largely uncontroversial:
Agencies have expertise in their issue area.

232. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory
Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1669–86 (2019).
233. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S.Ct 2551, 2579 (2019) (“We have never before found
Overton Park’s exception satisfied, much less invalidated an agency action based on ‘pretext.’”).
234. Id. at 2584.
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Agencies have democratic legitimacy stemming from their
connection to an elected President and confirmation of high
officials by an elected Senate.
Courts do not have expertise in agency issue areas.
An agency rule that is not arbitrary or capricious under current
doctrine must have a rational basis.
Pretext doctrine would be aimed only at rules that are otherwise not
arbitrary or capricious—rules that would survive APA review as it currently
stands. Reversal of a justified rule means adoption of a status quo that
agencies have reason to believe is worse than the new rule. A court reversing
on grounds of pretext also does not necessarily believe that the status quo is
a better policy than the new rule. Of course, we might suspect that a judge
reversing on grounds of pretext also does not believe in the policy under
review, but in theory the doctrine does not require the judge to believe more
in the status quo.
A famous thought experiment called the “philosophical zombie” asks
how we know other people have consciousness. How would we, as external
observers, differentiate between other people having consciousness and other
people merely operating by automated processes of the brain?235 The point
is that we could not tell from our external vantage. For our present inquiry
about pretext, one can similarly ask: What difference do we see between an
agency that has a rich inner life of nefarious motives and an agency that issues
the same rule with the same rationale, but actually believes the rationale? As
discussed earlier in the various potential scenarios of pretext, the extent to
which an agency has a unified rationale in the first place is debatable. Yet
even if agencies have a “real” rationale that is not publicly endorsed, so long
as they are adopting justified rules, it seems like it would be in the country’s
interests to allow the rule to stand.236
Logically, the objection to pretext must be that we want agencies to do
the right thing for the right reasons, but that sort of philosophical objection
almost never shows up in law because it is usually pointless. For example,
we do not ask if someone obeying the speed limit is doing so out of fear of
punishment or an admirable desire to promote safety. To care about the
motivation of someone doing the right thing is both utopian and totalitarian.

235. Philosophical Zombie, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
(last visited July 19, 2019).
236. Cf. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding agency
action despite clear shortcomings of the agency’s explanation).
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Of course, an individual can do the right thing in service of a crime—think
of a bank robber driving the speed limit away from the scene of his crime.
However, the bank robber’s motivation for following the law does not
provide an independent ground for prosecution in that case.
One example where motivation matters when performing an otherwise
unobjectionable official act is bribery of public officials, which federal law
prohibits even if the action performed might have an independent
justification.237 However, the bribery statute requires a bad act (seeking or
accepting something of benefit) in addition to the otherwise justifiable
official action. Returning to the philosophical zombie analogy, one can
externally distinguish between an agency official conducting ordinary agency
business and an agency official performing the same action because of a
bribe. The official does something in addition to the action—he receives or
asks for payment. Unless the agency decisionmaker confesses to offering a
pretextual rationale at the moment she makes the decision being reviewed,
there is no external manifestation to distinguish them from an agency
decisionmaker acting with a non-pretextual rationale. Pretext doctrine thus
appears to be designed in a way that is uniquely bad for the country. It is a
philosophically muddled idea that only matters in cases where the agency
action is otherwise justified.
B. Can Pretext Doctrine Be Applied in a Non-Arbitrary Manner?
Assume for the sake of argument that there are some rules that should
be reversed even if they have adequate legal justification. Before agreeing
that we should have a doctrine to identify and reverse those rules, we should
have some confidence that we can (a) identify those rules; (b) identify only
those rules (i.e., generate few if any false positives); and (c) provide
sufficiently clear guidance so as to be reliably useful for every federal district
court in the country. The Roberts pretext doctrine suggests that a rationale is
pretextual if it plays an “insignificant” role in the actual decision-making
process. There are two layers of vagueness involved in this concept: (1) the
inherent uncertainty as to when consideration becomes significant; and (2)
what kinds of consideration should count for assessing significance.
The first layer of vagueness is easy to understand—in any but the most
extreme cases, significance or insignificance is purely contextual, necessarily
defined in relation to a particular judge’s preconceived notions about the case
at hand. Consider a rule where the agency decisionmaker received a briefing
on the legal rationale before issuing the final rule, but emailed every day
about the allegedly “true” rationale for the rule (for example, its political
237. Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, 18 U.S.C. § 201.
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impact). How is a judge to know whether the legal rationale played a
significant role?
Does the agency decisionmaker need some
contemporaneous documentation that they listened attentively to the briefing
and found it useful? Anyone who has ever briefed a superior knows that they
sometimes completely ignore briefings, but other times have encyclopedic
recall of a minute detail. How is one to know whether the legal rationale
played a significant role?
The second layer of vagueness is subtler, pertaining more to what counts
toward a particular rationale playing a “role.” Imagine a situation in which
an agency decisionmaker says something like: “Thank God there turned out
to be a sufficient independent rationale for my action; I also dislike someone
who will be disadvantaged by my agency’s action.” In one sense, the legal
rationale played no role in the agency head’s decision since he just wanted to
use it to justify the action. However, the fact that there was a justification
played a hugely important role—the quote suggests the decisionmaker would
not have taken the action without the legal justification. The legal rationale
is simultaneously pretextual and indispensable to the rulemaking process.
Some amount of vagueness can be settled through federal common law
establishing what constitutes a “significant“ role. However, a concept as
riddled with vagueness as “significant” roles in decision-making might allow
every court virtually unlimited latitude to uphold or reverse any rule at will.
These are the sorts of outcomes Justice Thomas warned against in his partial
dissent in Department of Commerce.238
C. Realpolitik: Is Pretext Doctrine Simply a Fig Leaf for Filtering Out
Procedurally Awful Trump Administration Actions?
The hoary admonition that hard cases make bad law might have
reasonably applied to judicial oversight of the Trump administration. Chief
Justice Roberts may have rightly intended Department of Commerce to
rectify one specific situation as surgically as possible by creating a
circumscribed doctrine that future administrations can easily avoid now that
they are on notice. Indeed, this account jibes well with the rumor that Chief
Justice Roberts originally planned to vote to overturn the lower court ruling
against the Department, but changed his vote at the last minute when new
email evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the VRA

238. Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2576 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]f taken seriously as a rule of
decision, this holding would transform administrative law. . . . Crediting these accusations on
evidence as thin as the evidence here could lead judicial review of administrative proceedings to
devolve into an endless morass of discovery and policy disputes not contemplated by the [APA].”)
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explanation was pretextual.239 Roberts’s opinion remanded the citizenship
question back to the Department, but one could support the outcome of
Department of Commerce and still think pretext doctrine should be a one-off
solution to a problem unique (so far) to the Trump administration.
The argument from realpolitik is really two separate propositions. One
is that Department of Commerce itself presented a uniquely important case
with a particularly ugly agency process. The specific outcome of Department
of Commerce was more important than a run-of-the-mill Supreme Court case
because the Census dictates the apportionment of democratic power at the
federal level. The Department acted with such bad faith that judicial review
of agency action would appear toothless and corrupt to the average citizen if
the Court did not overturn the rule. By dodging this particular bullet, the
Court has bought the country ten more years to cool down and step back from
the Stalingrad-esque total war between Republicans and Democrats, where
every norm is shattered and even the Census is just another tool to extract
political advantage.
The other, slightly broader realpolitik argument is that the Trump
administration created the need for new rules of judicial review of agency
action. One can view this argument as not being against pretext doctrine per
se, but rather an acknowledgment that pretext doctrine will likely only affect
extremely shoddy, dishonest rulemakings. As briefly discussed earlier,
Justice Thomas alleged in his partial dissent that Department of Commerce
created an “administration-specific standard.”240
In his view, any
administration might run afoul of the pretext rule, but it was only being
applied against the Trump administration. However, one could argue instead
that the pretext rule has always existed, but it was only recently unearthed
because the Trump administration was uniquely incompetent.241
The common thread in these two arguments is that pretext doctrine,
having been conjured into existence, can now be retired—or, at least, it could
have been retired at the end of the Trump administration on January 20, 2021.
While there is no need to overturn the doctrine, one could argue it should not
be read as creating new onerous rules for agencies in future administrations.
If the Trump administration was uniquely incompetent, it stands to reason
that future administrations could avoid violating pretext doctrine even if the
doctrine was not tailor-made for Department of Commerce. For example,
courts could interpret the requirement that the legal rationale play a
239. See Samuel Estreicher, “Pretext” and Review of Executive Decisionmaking in the
Citizenship Census Question Case, VERDICT (July 9, 2019), https://verdict.justia.com/2019/07/09/
pretext-and-review-of-executive-decisionmaking-in-the-citizenship-census-question-case.
240. Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2576–77 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241. See e.g., Glicksman & Hammond, supra note 232, at 1669.
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significant role as meaning only that the agency decisionmaker be aware of
the legal rationale before making her decision. Mere awareness could be
proven by the agency decisionmaker ever having discussed the issue at hand
in the legal rationale at some point. In Department of Commerce, by contrast,
there was no evidence that the Secretary had ever considered enforcement of
the VRA by the time he ordered his underlings to find an acceptable rationale
for inclusion of a citizenship question on the Census.
D. The Argument for Pretext Doctrine
Notwithstanding the objections raised above, there is, in fact, a purpose
in punishing agencies for pretextual explanations: deterring agencies from
abusing the deference accorded based on their expertise.242 The quick and
dirty model of how agencies fit into the federal government is that Congress
delegated its power in specific areas to agencies whose expertise allow them
to make better and faster judgments than Congress.243 The APA and similar
laws allow judges a check on the power of agencies, with the understanding
that courts should ordinarily defer to agencies because of their expertise.244
Because the agencies have greater expertise than the courts, agencies
necessarily have the ability to “sell” certain rules to the courts that are not
actually based on expertise.
This is analogous to the relationship between a car owner and a
mechanic. A problem, familiar to any car owner, is that mechanics can abuse
their expertise to sell unnecessary repairs to an ignorant owner. Similarly,
Judges, like car owners, cannot detect when they are being deceived.
Agencies, like mechanics, can abuse this information mismatch by
deceptively claiming actual expertise. Pretext doctrine is a way to address
the cases where a court has external evidence that the agency was not basing
its decision on actual expertise.245 In the mechanic analogy, pretext doctrine
addresses the narrow range of cases where the car owner overhears one
mechanic saying to another, “I bet you can sell the car owner a new set of
tires too if you say the tires look rough.” Under arbitrary and capricious
review without the pretext doctrine, one would simply ask if the mechanic
had some basis for saying the tires looked rough, and whether the tires
looking rough is correlated with needing new tires. Analogically, pretext

242. This is akin to the exclusionary rule in criminal law, where the draconian sanction of totally
excluding relevant evidence is meant to deter police misconduct. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655–57.
243. See e.g., Eric Schlabs, The Problem with Delegation, REGUL. REV. (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.theregreview.org/2015/12/02/schlabs-problem-with-delegation/.
244. See, e.g., Fox v. Clinton, 684 F.3d 67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
245. See, e.g., Dep’t of Com., 139 S.Ct at 2574.
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doctrine allows the owner (the judge) to distrust the advice of the mechanic
even if the tires do look rough. Just as it would be foolish for a car owner to
ignore evidence of abuse by a mechanic, it would be foolish of courts not to
use extrinsic evidence of bad faith to calibrate their deference to agencies.
The owner can still take the tires, but at the very least he should accord less
deference to the mechanic’s opinion than he otherwise would have.
Figure 1: Identifying Actions Where Pretext Review is Helpful

Actions agency can
justify

Actions based on
agency’s
expertise

Unjustifiable
arbitrary and
capricious actions

1. Pretext Doctrine is a Necessary Correction to the Trajectory of
Arbitrary and Capricious Review
To understand why pretext doctrine is necessary, we must first
understand what function it would fill that is not currently served by arbitrary
and capricious review. Over the decades, since arbitrary and capricious
review first came about, courts have slowly abstracted it away from looking
into the real process by which the agency decision was made. They have
turned it into a box-checking exercise, showing the agency at least pretended
to listen to public comment and was aware of the empirical reality of the issue
at hand. This is perhaps unsurprising: Any bureaucracy over time begins to
sanctify habitual activities as rituals long after the activity has ceased to fulfill
its original role. 246 Pretext review, whether viewed as an amendment to
arbitrary and capricious review or a totally different doctrine, forces judges
in extreme cases to consider what process the agency actually followed to
reach a decision.
Arbitrary and capricious doctrine evolved pursuant to the incentives
facing courts and agencies, with the result that the doctrine examines an

246. Michael A. Diamond, The Social Character of Bureaucracy: Anxiety and Ritualistic
Defense, 6 POL. PSYCH. 663, 669–71 (1985).
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idealized agency decision-making process. The APA explicitly directs courts
to examine whether agency activities are arbitrary and capricious.247 Courts
naturally look at the data and documents relied upon by the agency—the socalled administrative record. Once simple in concept, the administrative
record, predictably, took on a life of its own. As agencies became aware that
the “record” was what they would be judged on, they began not to produce a
record at all, which in turn created cases like Overton Park.248 In Overton
Park, the Court encouraged agencies to create a record—if the agency failed
to produce a record, courts could order the deposition of senior officials or
other probing measures to get at the truth.249 Forced to produce a record,
agencies began to produce reams of data and empirical arguments. Courts
grew accustomed to relying on the administrative record, creating an
evidentiary problem: How would one truly know whether the administrative
record was complete and documented the true decision-making process?
While there are doctrines allowing for augmentation of the record, they only
come into effect on some sort of showing of bad faith, which creates a
chicken-and-egg problem for litigants. How can one find evidence of bad
faith to justify further discovery without the court authorizing additional
discovery in the first place? And, without pretext doctrine, even if there was
bad faith, what would be the ultimate goal of this additional discovery?
Faced with the difficult task of determining when an administrative
record is complete, courts have grown complacent, largely accepting the
agency’s produced administrative record.250 Able to confine their review to
the record, courts focus arbitrary and capricious review on whether the record
itself seems to put forward a sufficient case—regardless of whether it is really
a record of the agency’s true decision-making process.251 That normalizing
of the “record” runs deep in administrative law and creates an atmosphere of
artificiality, where agencies act for political reasons but feign detached
expertise. This phenomenon has generated dozens of law review articles
either calling for acceptance of political justifications or calling for
maintenance of apolitical records.252 These arguments ignore an even more
fundamental question: whether agencies should be allowed to produce

247. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
248. See generally 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
249. Id. at 420.
250. See, e.g., Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A. Platt, Administrative Records and the Courts, 67
U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2018) (describing the historical evolution of the administrative record).
251. Indeed, some courts went so far as to look beyond the administrative record to later court
filings to discern a possible agency explanation. E.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336,
1361 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
252. See generally, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001).
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anodyne-but-fictional accounts of why rules are adopted. The normalization
of the “record” explains how a purported foe of the administrative state like
Justice Thomas could note with incredulity in Department of Commerce that
the Court was taking the radical step of asking for the actual rationale from
the agency.253 It is also unsurprising that appellate judges, accustomed to
accepting a fact record from lower courts that roughly correspond to
underlying truth, were quick to accept judicial review largely confined to the
record.
The smoothing out of arbitrary and capricious review into a tidy process
where agencies produce a record and judges happily restrict their review to
that record allows agencies to fake a higher level of expert guidance than they
actually offer. Pretext doctrine, whether conceived as a standalone doctrine
or a new aspect of arbitrary and capricious review, grounds judicial review
of agency action in the actual process agencies used to generate the rule. It
inherently requires looking beyond the record, and in so doing weakens the
ability of agencies to abuse their expertise.
2. Pretext Review Helps Guide Agencies Back to an Expertise-Based
Model of Administration
Abuse of agency expertise emerges from the inherent principal-agent
problem between Congress and the administrative agencies. Congress tasked
agencies with perceiving and acting upon truth, founded on the actual data
the agencies can gather about the real world and the impact of federal
policies. However, Congress has a typical principal-agent problem: It has
different information and interests from the agencies. How does it really
know whether the agencies are acting consistent with Congress’s interests as
manifested by the laws Congress has passed? How does it know that the
agencies are acting upon the best information? The problem is rendered more
complicated by the fact that agencies really have multiple principals:

253. One might wonder why conservative judges and justices seem less inclined to demand truth
from agencies given the ideological hostility of conservatives to the administrative state. While
warranting more than a footnote’s worth of analysis, one possible explanation is a conservative
distrust of expertise in any form. A good agency, to a conservative theorist, is not one making the
best technical judgments, but one that reliably does little and seeks to relinquish what authority it
does have. That may explain why, for example, the Trump administration appointed so many
politicians and former lobbyists as agency heads rather than individuals with relevant scientific
expertise in the field in question. For example, former Texas Governor Rick Perry served as
Secretary of Energy, to be succeeded by former lobbyist Dan Brouilette. See Cecelia SmithSchoenwalder, Trump Announces Replacement for Energy Secretary Rick Perry, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD RPT. (Oct. 18, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/nationalnews/articles/2019-10-18/trump-picks-dan-brouillette-to-replace-energy-secretary-rick-perry.
Under the preceding Obama administration, the position was held in succession by two Nobellaureate physicists.
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Congress and the President, as represented by his political appointees. In the
modern era, agency nominees largely sail through the confirmation process
as long as the party controlling the Senate is the same as the party controlling
the White House, removing one of the main ways Congress can manage the
principal-agent dilemma. Pretext review removes one way in which agencies
can pretend to serve their congressional principal while actually serving the
executive principal.254
Originally, agencies were a way to offload technical decisions from
Congress to agencies. They are now one of the primary means of effectuating
partisan ends because it is increasingly difficult to get legislation through
Congress.255 Now that the agencies are viewed as tools of the President,
commentators feel a need to defend executive prerogatives.256 This is
crucially important for understanding the impetus for pretext theory. Courts
will never have the technical expertise of agencies. The democratic
legitimacy of agencies arises from Congress’s delegation of power to them,
a gift that was premised on the agencies’ technocratic nature. A doctrine of
pretext is an important tool for preventing agencies—or, more properly,
Presidents—from abusing that power.
Some critics of the regulatory state look askance at agency claims of
expertise.257 To those critics, there is no such thing as neutral expertise, only
shrouded political preferences or selfish desire to aggrandize power. These
critiques have a kernel of philosophical truth: Even career employees at
agencies have political views, and they can have an interest in accumulating
power through regulation. However, critics of agencies take this basic truth,
divorce it from any empirical assessment of agency bias, and then effectively
conclude that there should be no limits on agency politicization because of
the unitary executive model.258 If a democratically elected president uses
agencies to advance his policies, these critics argue, we need not worry about

254. Congress has increasingly lost control over agencies in recent decades. See, e.g., INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983) (striking down a legislative veto on immigration decisions).
255. See Derek Willis and Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped Working, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5,
2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-congress-stopped-working.
256. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, supra note 252, at 2246.
257. See, e.g., Victor Davis Hanson, Civilization Requires Collective Common Sense, NAT’L
REV. (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/09/coronavirus-policing-wildfireseffective-response-requires-collective-common-sense/#slide-1 (arguing that common sense was
superior to agency expertise in combating the coronavirus pandemic).
258. See, e.g., PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(describing executive agencies as “perfectly constitutional” but independent agencies as a “greater
threat to individual liberty because they operate free of the President’s supervision and direction.”).
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whether the agencies are drawing on any real knowledge to inform their
actions.259
The critics who distrust expertise for fear of bias ultimately create a
more open, pernicious bias. It is not hard to see why: If the experts do not
direct policy at the agencies, the only thing left to fill the vacuum of power
is brute politics. This dynamic explains why the heads of virtually every
major rulemaking agency under President Trump were former elected
officials or lobbyists.260 Experts can certainly be biased, but they are less
biased than elected officials. If that policy concern is not sufficiently
persuasive, perhaps respect for the will of Congress would suffice. After all,
expertise is the model Congress endorsed for the agencies in the first place.261
One can examine the legislative history for any of the administrative agencies
and find no end to justifications based on the need for expertise.262 It is much
tougher sledding to find members of Congress advocating that agencies
should reflect the will of the executive rather than expertise in their particular
field.
3. Contra Justice Thomas, the Downside Risk is Limited
The potential for increased litigation in arbitrary and capricious review
does not immediately imply that courts should apply pretext doctrine. What
if, as Justice Thomas alleged in his opinion, litigants swamp courts with
pretext-based challenges to virtually all agency actions? Pretext is certainly
something litigants can claim against virtually any agency action. But
consider that arbitrary and capricious review is also something litigants can
use against virtually any agency action.263 The increased burden on judicial
259. Id. (describing executive agencies as “accountable to the President” and observing that
“[t]he President in turn is accountable to the people of the United States for the exercise of executive
power in the executive agencies”).
260. Consider, for example, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Energy Dan
Brouillette, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Andrew Wheeler, and Secretary
of the Interior David Bernhardt.
261. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative
State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1404 (2013) (“By the mid-1930s, Congress had authorized
agency action to exercise discretion under broad and imprecise statutory directives . . . . To justify
broad and unstructured delegations to agencies under the New Deal, supporters of the expanded
administrative state proposed the expertise model.”)
262. See, e.g., Hearing on Nomination of Attorney General Scott Pruitt to be Administrator of
the U.S. Env’t Protection Agency Before the Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 1, 20
(2017) (statement of Scott Pruitt, EPA Administrator Nominee) (“The agency must be committed
to using its expertise in environmental issues not to end run Congress, but rather to implement its
direction, so that Congress may decide the proper policies for our Nation, and the EPA can go about
the business of enacting effective regulations that survive legal scrutiny.”).
263. There are exceptions, of course, but the universe of agency actions unreviewable under the
APA for arbitrary and capricious review is presumably coterminous with agency actions
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resources would come about not from the claims themselves, but from the
presumed increase in discovery for plaintiffs alleging pretext. As the doctrine
currently stands, litigants must make a showing of bad faith to obtain that
additional discovery. That part of administrative law predates pretext
review.264 Pretext review only changes the scenario where additional
discovery beyond the agency record reveals that the agency used pretextual
reasoning. In that case, the agency’s action can be remanded or overturned.
Opponents of pretext review claim that the influx of pretext claims could
swamp agencies and courts, but forget that most major agency actions are
already subject to litigation.265 If there is no evidence of bad faith, the claims
will not meaningfully increase the workload of courts or agencies. If litigants
claim that every minor agency action is pretextual, they presumably will not
have evidence of bad faith, and thus would not be able to drag proceedings
out any further than they could already under arbitrary and capricious review.
And, of course, if litigants can produce evidence of bad faith in a wide variety
of agency actions, our concern should not be the administrative burden of
additional discovery, but rather how we can induce agencies to act more often
on proper rationales.
4. Next Steps in Refining Pretext Doctrine
The foregoing discussion showed that pretext doctrine can fill an
important hole in regulatory law, but it remains to be seen whether courts can
actually fashion a workable doctrine from the outline laid out by Chief Justice
Roberts in Department of Commerce. To avoid the pitfalls identified by the
dissenters in Department of Commerce, pretext doctrine must become more
specific—either through more precise wording of the central tenets or
through federal common law applying the doctrine to specific kinds of cases.
Courts will have to narrow the doctrine to allow a less-than-perfect mindmeld between agency decisionmakers and the legal rationales generated by
their subordinates. At the same time, if the doctrine is going to deter future
agencies from abusing the decision-making process, it will have to be broad
enough that agencies actually fear judicial review on grounds of pretext.
The Roberts doctrine contains several points of vagueness, but that is
not unusual for the first ruling in a major new doctrine. Consider an analogy

unreviewable for pretext. If subsequent cases find pretext to be a subset of arbitrary and capricious
review, this problem happily disappears. If not, courts will have to decide where the boundaries lie.
264. See Citizens to Protect Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
265. See Margot Sanger-Katz, For Trump Administration, It Has Been Hard to Follow the Rules
on Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/upshot/for-trumpadministration-it-has-been-hard-to-follow-the-rules-on-rules.html (describing thirty major
deregulatory actions by the Trump administration challenged in court).
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to District of Columbia v. Heller,266 the 2008 Second Amendment case that
first recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms.267 The case did
not create a clear test to determine whether a particular restriction on gun
ownership violated that individual right, but provided a foundation for other
courts to build upon, including the Supreme Court itself in future cases.268
Similarly, Department of Commerce should be seen not as a completed
doctrine, but as a starting point.
E. What an “Insignificant“ Role for the Stated Rationale Means
As discussed above, an “insignificant” role for the legal rationale is
vague on its face. However, it is not difficult to see how courts could make
the rule more specific through archetypal cases. Building a common law
around the definition of “insignificant” will likely be easier than coming up
with a precise a priori definition. For example, an “insignificant” role could
be proven by showing that the decision had already been made before the
pretextual reason was brought to the attention of the decisionmaker. This is,
essentially, the Department of Commerce scenario, where the Secretary and
his immediate subordinates were documented to be searching around for a
legal rationale and then extracted it from the DOJ through a tortuously
political process.269 One can imagine several other common evidentiary
scenarios where the courts could find insignificance of the pretextual reason:
First, the decisionmaker could state in an email that they want to adopt
the rule regardless of whether the pretextual reason is true. For example, the
decisionmaker could say something like, “Find out if this rationale is true,
and if it is not, find another one.”
Second, the decisionmaker could state a reason for the action that is
inconsistent with the pretextual rationale. This did not arise in the
Department of Commerce scenario, but one could envision an email where
the Secretary said he wanted a citizenship question to lower apparent
minority population totals in Democrat-leaning districts for apportionment

266. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
267. Id. at 635.
268. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has not yet done so, but it may do so in the near future.
Lower courts have certainly engaged with Heller, though most often those courts decline to extend
Heller’s ruling to prohibit any particular firearm regulation. The few exceptions have not resulted
in major policy changes. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir.
2016) (finding that barring a person who once briefly had a mental illness from ever owning a
firearm violated the Second Amendment). The Supreme Court also granted certiorari for a Second
Amendment case in the coming term. New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. Corlett, No. 20-843,
2021 WL 1602643, at __ (U.S. Apr. 26, 2021).
269. See supra Part I.F.
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purposes. That would fly in the face of the VRA enforcement rationale the
Court found to be pretextual.
Third, the President or presidential advisors could direct the
decisionmaker to adopt a particular course of action. This is perhaps the most
controversial, but recall that it would only come into play in a situation where
bad faith has been shown. If the President directed the agency decisionmaker to adopt a rule for reasons totally unrelated to the eventual pretextual
reason, that could warrant reversal or remand on pretext grounds.
The above list is, of course, not exhaustive, but should suffice to
illustrate how courts can approach a theoretically difficult concept like
pretext. The key is not to come up with a definition rigorous enough to satisfy
a philosopher, but rather to identify certain problematic situations through
the natural experience of common law and apply the label pretext to them.
F. Using the “Bad Faith” Requirement to Avoid Pretext Review
Becoming Overinclusive
Recall the many marginal scenarios discussed earlier where a case could
be made that an agency acted pretextually, but not in a malevolent way.270
One such example involved an agency decisionmaker having already
effectively made up their mind on a rule based on a substantively similar
rationale to the one the agency came up with later, but without having seen
the actual data and results of the agency’s study. Few would want pretext
review to reverse or remand that kind of rulemaking, but it is difficult to come
up with an easily applied definition of pretext that would not include those
benign instances.
The “bad faith” requirement can go a long way towards weeding out the
thorny philosophical problems that could arise in pretext review. For
example, one of the key questions raised above is whether one can “count”
the legal rationale as significant if it only factored into the rulemaking for
legal purposes—in other words, if the decisionmaker only considered the
legal rationale because they knew they needed legal cover. It seems obvious
that if pretext rationale is to mean anything, merely seeking out a legal
rationale for purposes of surviving judicial review cannot suffice. Upon
reflection, however, it is clear there are some situations where a rule probably
should not be overturned on these grounds. Earlier in this article, I discussed
the possibility of an agency head with a relatively benign use of pretext,
where an underlying desire to do something charitable was masked by an
irrelevant legal rationale.271 One can also imagine a situation where the
270. See supra Part II.A.
271. See supra Part II.A.
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agency decisionmaker had already made up their mind about what to do, but
had the agency generate a fully fleshed out legal rationale. For example, the
EPA Administrator may have already made up their mind to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions on public health grounds, and the agency’s cost-benefit
analysis stressed the cost of alternative mitigation measures (for example,
building seawalls). The “bad faith” requirement protects these innocent uses
of what might be considered “pretext,” while allowing reversal and remand
of pernicious instances.
III. CONCLUSION
As with many new concepts, pretext review defies easy understanding,
lacks precise definitions, and appears menacing to those skeptical of change.
A strong analogy could be made to flight, the exact scientific underpinnings
of which are still in debate to this day.272 However, just as flight has become
a fundamental part of everyday life despite our incomplete understanding of
it, pretext review can become a vital part of administrative law even if the
philosophical conundrums about decision-making are not easily resolvable.
Pretext review should be seen as a helpful evolution of arbitrary and
capricious doctrine to address the politicization of agency expertise—a
particular problem that, while not new, has steadily evolved into a more
dangerous phenomenon.
While the debate over agency politicization reached a new intensity
under President Trump, the issue will linger on in future presidencies. Any
high school civics student can describe the foundation of the U.S. federal
government and the split between legislative and executive power. Congress
makes the law; the President enforces the law. Agencies, to be blunt, ruin
this paradigm. Congress, beset by the technical onslaught of modernity,
delegates specific powers to agencies. For example, Congress has neither the
time nor the expertise to precisely set policy relating to the assignment of
broadcast spectrum, so it passed a broad law that allows the Federal
Communications Commission to handle the details. In this paradigm,
agencies are drone legislatures, capable of independent action but following
a course established by controllers in Congress. Pretext review helps solve
the principal-agent dilemma between Congress and agencies by making it
harder for agencies to act based on political rationales endorsed by the
executive branch rather than the specific criteria endorsed by Congress.
One broad objection to the idea of pretext review is that it is utopian to
expect agencies to be immune from politics and act only upon neutral
272. Ed Regis, No One Can Explain Why Planes Stay in the Air, SCI. AM. (Feb. 1, 2020),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/no-one-can-explain-why-planes-stay-in-the-air/.
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technocratic grounds. This objection stinks of resignation and decline.
Ultimately, the only thing that keeps an institution honest is the belief of its
members and clients that it should be so. If we expect agencies to act
politically, they will eventually do so, and the very voices complaining that
we can expect nothing more will be the first to proclaim that it was inevitable.
While pretext review cannot cure all that ails the federal regulatory system,
it is at least a step away from fatalistic acceptance of politicization. If it is
utopian to expect neutral expertise, it is at least preferable that courts nudge
agencies toward utopia rather than dystopia.

